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DISMANTLING THE MASTER’S HOUSE: TOWARD A JUSTICE-
BASED THEORY OF COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Etienne C. Toussaint* 
ABSTRACT
Since the end of the American Civil War, scholars have debated the efficacy of 
various models of community economic development, or CED. Historically, this 
debate has tracked one of two approaches: place-based models of CED, seeking to 
stimulate community development through market-driven economic growth 
programs, and people-based models of CED, focused on the removal of structural 
barriers to social and economic mobility that prevent human flourishing. More 
recently, scholars and policymakers have turned to a third model from the impact 
investing community—the social impact bond, or SIB. The SIB model of CED 
ostensibly finds a middle ground by leveraging funding from private impact 
investors to finance social welfare programs within marginalized communities. 
SIBs seemingly answer the call of local government law scholars of the New 
Regionalists movement who advocate for governmental mechanisms that facilitate 
regional cooperation, address equity concerns, and respect local government 
autonomy. However, this Article argues that the SIB model of impact investing 
will struggle to advance metropolitan equity due to its grounding in the politics of 
neoliberalism.
After highlighting limitations of the SIB, this Article links contemporary 
debates about CED theory to historical contestations within the black community 
about economically-oriented racial uplift strategies. Placing historical figures, such 
as W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington, in conversation with more 
contemporary theorists of political philosophy, this Article offers an alternative 
conceptual framework of CED. Termed justice-based CED, this framing 
distinguishes a typology of social change that places democracy at the epicenter of 
the development debate and points toward the political principles of the solidarity 
economy as guideposts for law reform. The justice-based approach rests upon three 
core values: social solidarity, economic democracy, and solidarity economy. Taken 
together, this perspective reflects a vision of political morality that embodies one of 
America’s most foundational democratic values—human moral dignity. 
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“It’s funny how money change a situation / Miscommunication 
lead to complication / My emancipation don’t fit your equation / I 
was on the humble you on every station.”—Lauryn Hill, Lost 
Ones1
“Democracy is flawed both economically and socially . . . justice for 
Black people cannot be achieved without radical changes in the 
structure of our society.”—Martin Luther King, Jr.2
INTRODUCTION
I grew up in the birthplace of hip-hop. As a young boy, the 
South Bronx felt like an oasis in New York City’s burgeoning me-
tropolis; a concrete playground filled with infectious hip-hop mu-
sic and inspiring graffiti art murals; a predominantly black and 
Hispanic family of families brimming with cultural diversity; a tex-
tured mosaic of style colored by a broad spectrum of hardworking 
immigrants chasing an ever-elusive American Dream. My summer 
days were filled with the sounds of children laughing in the street 
                                                   
 1. LAURYN HILL, Lost Ones, on THE MISEDUCATION OF LAURYN HILL (1998). 
 2. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A Testament of Hope, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES (1969). 
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as they danced barefoot under fire hydrant showers, while evenings 
featured sports broadcasters narrating the New York Yankees’ latest 
victory through my grandfather’s shortwave radio. We Bronxians 
shared in the riches of a “cultural collective efficacy”3 that imbued 
us with a sense of joy and pride in our uptown community.4
However, the media routinely depicted the South Bronx with far 
more hackneyed metaphors; nightly news reports displayed a low-
income urban neighborhood poisoned by a culture of negative at-
titudes, wayward values, and unlawful conduct that had resulted in 
a debilitating, yet persistent, state of social dysfunction—failing 
public education, unflagging unemployment, rampant drug use, 
and widespread criminal activity.5 While I observed some of these 
social challenges firsthand, the assumptions about the character 
and conviction of Bronx residents, in my estimation, undermined 
the positive social capital that I witnessed during my adolescence.6 I 
would soon discover that what American philosopher Cornel West 
refers to as a “sentimental nihilism” had not only infiltrated media 
culture in the Bronx, but had also shaped the perspective of local 
governments who sought to improve the lives of their urban resi-
dents.7 I would also learn that the same jaundiced narratives of 
poverty, and the same stereotypical perspectives on urban culture 
that plagued my childhood neighborhood of the Bronx,8 have 
manifested in other low-income communities around the country.9
                                                   
 3. See Lisa Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing: Revisiting Culture, Urban Space, Power, and 
Law, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 803, 829–30 (2012) (“Cultural collective efficacy is a form of positive 
bonding social capital generated through participation in cultural endeavors, which enables 
some low-income, inner-city residents to mitigate the negative effects of living in a poor, ra-
cially segregated, and disinvested community.”). 
 4. Historians of urban culture locate the birthplace of hip-hop, which comprises not 
only the oral tradition called rapping, but also the hip-hop elements of breakdancing, graffi-
ti art, DJing, and beatboxing, in New York City’s Bronx borough neighborhoods. See generally
Jeff Chang, CAN’T STOP WON’T STOP: A HISTORY OF THE HIP-HOP GENERATION 67–85 (2005). 
 5. Hauntingly similar to present-day stories about low-income communities across 
America, I still vividly recall the media narrative of Amadou Diallo, a young black man who 
was shot forty-one times by police officers in front of his Bronx apartment building after his 
pager was mistaken for a gun. See Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Un-
armed Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/
nyregion/officers-in-bronx-fire-41-shots-and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html?pagewanted=all. 
 6. See generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK 
LIBERATION 218 (2016) (“Historically, the insistence that Black deprivation is rooted in 
Black culture and in Black people has deflected attention away from the systemic roots of 
racism, compelling African Americans to look inward instead of making demands on the 
state and others.”). 
 7. See CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM
36 (Reprint ed. 2005) (defining “sentimental nihilists” as those who are “willing to sidestep 
or even bludgeon the truth or unpleasant and unpopular facts and stories, in order to pro-
vide an emotionally satisfying show.”). 
 8. See infra section I. Within this Article, I take a Hegelian view toward the term ‘pov-
erty’ as a state of material lack leading to a “socially frustrated personality.” E.g., C. J. Pereira 
Di Salvo, Hegel’s Torment: Poverty and the Rationality of the Modern State, in HEGEL AND 
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Today, countless twenty-first century black and brown communi-
ties across America are facing the same socio-economic challenges 
that preoccupied many twentieth century development efforts.10
Not only has income inequality risen in the past few decades, but 
wages for low-income workers have remained relatively stagnant. 
Further, our recent housing crisis (coupled with a resulting eco-
nomic recession) has deepened the wealth gap between white and 
non-white households.11 We are witnessing a dramatic rise in the 
concentration of poverty across America.12 The number of Ameri-
cans living in high-poverty neighborhoods has nearly doubled 
since the year 2000, and black Americans and Latinos, in particu-
lar, are more than twice as likely to live in poverty as non-Latino 
white Americans.13 With costly environmental and financial disas-
ters tugging at the seams of social cohesion, many are now calling 
into question conventional wisdom about prevailing economic and 
political institutions.14 America’s democratic project, it seems, is 
                                                   
CAPITALISM 101, 110 ( Andrew Buchwalter ed., 2015) (“For Hegel, what is problematic is not 
just that the impoverished individual is dependent on the arbitrary wills of the wealthy. Ra-
ther, poverty is problematic because those who are subject to that condition are rendered in-
capable of realizing their personality.”) (emphasis in original). 
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE 
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES 2 (2014) (“Government policies turned black neighborhoods into 
overcrowded slums and white families came to associate African Americans with slum condi-
tions. White homeowners fled when African Americans moved nearby, fearing their new 
neighbors would bring slum conditions with them.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Scott Cummings, Thematic Overview: Community Development Law and Econom-
ic Justice—Why Law Matters, 26 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. AND CMTY. DEV. L. 31 (2017) (“At 
some level, distressingly, after all this time and work by so many committed and courageous 
people, we still confront the intransigent problems of class division, racial discrimination 
and segregation, and disregard for the plight of the most vulnerable members of our socie-
ty.”). 
 11. Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream, and 
the Challenge of Socio-Economic Inequality, 57 VILLANOVA L. REV. 339, 348–49 (2012) (“From 
2005 to 2009, black households lost just over half of their median net worth and Latino 
households lost 66%, compared with white families, who lost 16% of their net worth.”); 
Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African Americans Have Been Short-Changed Out of the 
Materials to Build Wealth, EPI.ORG (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-racial-
wealth-gap-how-african-americans-have-been-shortchanged-out-of-the-materials-to-build-
wealth/ (“More than one in four black households have zero or negative net worth, com-
pared to less than one in ten white families without wealth, which explains the large differ-
ences in the racial wealth gap . . . .”). 
 12. Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 11 (“Over the last twenty-five years, the disparity in 
household wealth has tripled; today, white median wealth (as opposed to income) is 
$91,405, compared to $6,446 for African American households.”). 
 13. MARJORIE KELLY & SARAH MCKINLEY, DEMOCRACY COLLABORATIVE, CITIES BUILDING 
COMMUNITY WEALTH 10 (2015), https://democracycollaborative.org/sites/clone.
community-wealth.org/files/downloads/CitiesBuildingCommunityWealth-Web.pdf; see gen-
erally Angus Deaton, The U.S. Can No Longer Hide from Its Deep Poverty Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html (not-
ing that “there are 5.3 million Americans who are absolutely poor by global standards.”). 
 14. See Peter Utting, Introduction to SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: BEYOND THE 
FRINGE? 5–6 (2015) (“Recurring crises linked to finance, food and energy, as well as aware-
ness of climate change, have fueled collective and solidaristic forms of coping, producing, 
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failing marginalized, low-income families in record numbers, and 
the promises of uplift evoked by the American Dream too oft have 
remained simply that—lofty and sweet sounding dreams for our na-
tion’s poorest citizens.15
My experiences in the Bronx have taught me that poverty mani-
fests across a wide spectrum of social dimensions (e.g., legal, edu-
cational, political, psychological, etc.), beckoning a diversity of 
community development strategies. Generally, community develop-
ment describes a process whereby community members, alongside 
civic leaders and government stakeholders, develop community-
oriented strategies to address local economic, political, social, and 
environmental problems.16 However, economists have historically 
emphasized economic growth policies—from demand-side strate-
gies, such as cutting taxes and interest rates, to supply-side inter-
ventions, such as deregulation and privatization—as market-
oriented solutions to ongoing social challenges.17 As a result, there 
has been tension between proponents of community development 
and economic development. Yet, legal scholars have long noted 
the intersectionality of both approaches; arguing, for example, that 
the social justice mission of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s18— in many ways carried on by today’s movement for 
black lives19—is inextricably linked to the economic justice of mar-
ginalized communities.20
                                                   
and provisioning . . . and called into question conventional wisdom about growth and indus-
trialization models.”). 
 15. The continued salience of the “American Dream” represents what Frantz Fanon has 
called the “colonization of the mind.” More than fifty years after its original publication, 
Fanon’s text, Black Skin, White Masks, conveys themes about the public perceptions of 
sources of individual wealth that endure today. See generally FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN,
WHITE MASKS (Grove Press 2008); see also RICH MORIN, RISING SHARE OF AMERICANS SEE
CONFLICT BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 3 (Pew Res. Ctr. 2012), http://assets.pewresearch.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/01/Rich_vs_poor-final_1-10-13.pdf (explaining that “a 
46% plurality believes that most rich people ‘are wealthy mainly because they know the right 
people or were born into wealthy families’ [while] . . . 43% say wealthy people became rich 
‘mainly because of their own hard work, ambition or education.’”). 
 16.  David M. Chavis & Abraham Wandersman, Sense of Community in the Urban Environ-
ment: A Catalyst for Participation and Community Development, AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 
56 (1990). 
 17. See generally Ronald F. Ferguson & William T. Dickens, Introduction to URBAN 
PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Ronald F. Ferguson & William T. Dickens eds.,
1999) (providing a survey of the history of urban development strategies in the twentieth 
century aimed at improving the quality of life in low- to moderate-income neighborhoods). 
 18. See CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. JUSTICE, Defining Economic Justice and Social Justice (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cesj.org/learn/definitions/defining-economic-justice-and-
social-justice/ (defining social justice as the existence of institutions that “imposes on each 
of us a personal responsibility to collaborate with others, at whatever level of the “Common 
Good” in which we participate, to design and continually perfect our institutions as tools for 
personal and social development.”). 
 19. See Etienne C. Toussaint, Incarceration to Incorporation: Economic Empowerment for Re-
turning Citizens Through Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
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Accordingly, upon the heels of the Civil Rights Movement, 
community economic development, or CED, emerged as a favored 
approach by governments and lawmakers to resolve the social di-
mensions of intergenerational poverty through community-
oriented economic development efforts.21 Yet, there has been on-
going debate on the appropriate focus of CED laws and public pol-
icies designed to improve economic opportunities for vulnerable 
citizens.22 CED has typically involved the creation of market-
oriented, “place-based” government-sponsored programs that pro-
vide private investors with tax incentives to bring economic bene-
fits (e.g., affordable housing and business enterprises) into low-
income communities.23 The place-based CED model embraces a 
“localist” approach to governance that preserves the autonomy of 
local governments to manage the financing and delivery of public 
                                                   
61, 62 n.3 (2016) (discussing the Black Lives Matter movement, which “seek[s] to affirm the 
lives of Black men and women who, on a daily basis, experience the negative impacts of in-
stitutionalized white supremacy and structural racism in America.”). 
 20. See Gary Chartier, Civil Rights and Economic Democracy, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 267
(2000) (“At root, civil rights struggles have consistently touched on questions, not only so-
cial and cultural, but also economic, questions about the organization and distribution of 
economic power and material goods.”); Laurie Hauber, Promoting Economic Justice Through 
Transactional Community-Centered Lawyering, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 4 (2007) (“Eco-
nomic justice requires striving to eliminate the imbalance of social and economic power in 
urban areas by providing equal access to economic opportunities.”); Susan R. Jones, Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy: An Economic Justice Imperative, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 44 
(2005) (“It is my position that economic justice must be advanced independently and as a 
critical part of social justice, racial justice and human rights.”). 
 21. See Patience A. Crowder, Inequality, Economic Development, and the New Regional Com-
munity, 43 SW. L. REV. 569, 573, 577 (2014) (“As a matter of public policy, economic devel-
opment programs are government-sponsored programs aimed at improving the economic 
vitality of a particular sector within a government’s jurisdiction.”); Audrey G. McFarlane, 
Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 304–05 
(1999) (“[T]he prevailing view [is] that law should be limited to ensuring equal opportunity 
rather than equality of outcome. . . . law is relegated to what is viewed as the unambiguously 
neutral, impartial, and supportive position of quietly facilitating the urban development 
process.”). 
 22. While some have called for a community orientation, others have emphasized busi-
ness development, and still others have focused on the intersectional nature of economic 
development. For discussions of historic community-oriented lawyering efforts in the pov-
erty law context, see generally, Susan D. Bennett, On Long-Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 771, 784–85 (1998); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighbor-
hood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Lucie E. White, Feminist Microenterprise: Vindi-
cating the Rights of Women in the New Global Order?, 50 ME. L. REV. 327 (1998). For discussions 
of historic lawyering efforts focused on stimulating microenterprise development, see general-
ly SUSAN R. JONES, A LEGAL GUIDE TO MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT: BATTLING POVERTY 
THROUGH SELF-EMPLOYMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND STAFF IN 
MICROENTERPRISE PROGRAMS (Am. Bar Ass’n 1998); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Com-
munity Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 
CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997). 
 23. The market-based strategy stands in contraposition to “community” economic de-
velopment, which refers to “social, human, and physical . . . activities at the neighborhood 
or community level,” empowering residents of marginalized neighborhoods to improve 
their livelihoods and community. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 296–97. 
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welfare services.24 Conversely, instead of focusing on the geograph-
ic boundaries of place, some advocates have called for a “people-
based” approach to CED, urging low-income families to “move to 
opportunity” in wealthier neighborhoods through social mobility 
programs.25 The people-based CED model embraces a “regionalist” 
approach to governance, calling for the creation of regional gov-
ernment structures to tackle metropolitan inequality or, at best, as 
many in the New Regionalist movement propose,26 regional modes 
of informal cooperation or collaboration. Both the place-based 
and people-based approaches have faced criticism for their inabil-
ity to meet the needs of all low-income families, and for their em-
bedded racialized narratives about low-income neighborhoods.27
Pay-for-success financing has emerged as a new CED model that 
ostensibly finds a middle ground in the ongoing development de-
bate by transcending the ‘people’ versus ‘place’ dichotomy. It 
seemingly offers what scholars have called a “new governance” ap-
proach to CED that engages non-traditional stakeholders in the 
public decision-making process.28 Bolstered by a growing commu-
nity of socially conscious “impact investors,”29 the pay-for-success 
                                                   
 24. See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (discussing the normative goals of local govern-
ment law). 
 25. See, e.g., Sara Aronchick Solow, Note, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-
Housing Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 483 (2010) (arguing that opportunity vouch-
ers lead to better outcomes for the housing insecure by eliminating racially concentrated 
ghettos because they decentralize low-income tenants based on race which avoids replica-
tion of the poor housing conditions common to traditional housing place-based projects);
Jens Ludwig, et al., Neighborhood Effects on the Long-Term Well-Being of Low-Income Adults From 
All Five Sites of the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 337 SCIENCE 1505 (2012). 
 26. See MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY, 12–13 (1997); DAVID RUSK, INSIDE/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR
URBAN AMERICA 153–335 (1999); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self Interest, and the Tyranny of 
the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000) 
(explaining the term “new regionalism” as “any attempt to develop regional governance 
structures or interlocal cooperative arrangements that better distribute regional benefits 
and burdens.”); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity and the New 
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 100–19 (2003); David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, 
Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2008) (describing 
new regionalist strategies as a form of “equitable regionalism,” which “recognizes that issues 
with distinct equity implications should be susceptible to regional cooperation because they 
are typically the subject of localist opposition”). 
 27. See generally infra section I.B. 
 28. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1674 (2001) (defining new governance as “the wide array of 
tools now being used to address public problems . . . the increased substitution of complex 
networks of organizations for the rigid hierarchies of old to solve public problems . . . .”). 
 29. While the term “impact investing” is relatively new, it builds upon America’s rich 
tradition of corporate philanthropy, pioneered by altruistic corporate titans like Andrew 
Carnegie, founder of the Carnegie Steel Corporation, and Henry Ford, founder of the Ford 
Motor Company. Indeed, the Ford Foundation remains an influential player in the impact 
investing community today. See Emily Chasan, Ford Foundation to Put $1 Billion of Endowment 
in Impact Funds, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
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model—typified by the social impact bond, or SIB—facilitates social
infrastructure development30 that empowers marginalized individ-
uals with resources to thrive in the communities where they live. 
Under the SIB, impact investors assume the financial risks of social 
welfare programs by taking a monetary loss if the program is un-
successful, and only earn a return on their investment if govern-
ment cost savings are achieved. Despite the SIB’s growing populari-
ty, this Article argues that the SIB will struggle to advance 
metropolitan equity31 because it is not a distinct theory of devel-
opment, but merely a new instantiation of neoliberal rationality. 
New Regionalists have long called for actionable frameworks to 
guide mechanisms of regional cooperation and collaboration that 
promote metropolitan equity while respecting local government 
autonomy.32
Responding to the call, this Article articulates an alternative 
conceptual framework of CED. Termed justice-based CED,33 this 
                                                   
2017-04-05/ford-foundation-to-put-1-billion-of-endowment-in-impact-funds; see also Chelsea 
McGrath, The Government’s Role in Unleashing Impact Investing’s Full Potential, 44 PEPP. L. REV.
799, 802 (2017) (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments made into companies, organiza-
tions, and funds with the intention to generate social and economic impact alongside a fi-
nancial return.’”). 
 30. Social infrastructure programs target challenges like prisoner recidivism or home-
lessness by making strategic investments into the health, housing, education, and employ-
ment of underserved populations. See GEORGIA LEVENSON KEOHANE, Innovative Finance in 
Communities Across the United States, in CAPITAL AND THE COMMON GOOD: HOW INNOVATIVE 
FINANCE IS TACKLING THE WORLD’S MOST URGENT PROBLEMS, 148, 156–57 (2016). 
 31. See David Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 5, 11 (2016) (defining metropolitan equity as “the idea that all parts of a region are 
relevant to the distribution of opportunity in any part, and that remedies for expanding 
mobility can and should be assessed on an equitable basis.”). 
 32. See for example Troutt, supra note 26, at 1173 (noting “equitable regionalism is a 
principle of local government law reform by which states enact legislation to compel interlo-
cal cooperation where equity, and often efficiency, demand it. Its goal is a more even distri-
bution of state resources across municipal populations, the transformation of marginal areas 
into more integrated communities and the reduction of significant disparities in the provi-
sion of public and private services among localities”). 
 33. The justice-based conceptual framework discussed herein builds upon the volumi-
nous work of critical and progressive scholars who have called for “community-oriented” 
economic development processes. See, e.g., Peter Pitegoff, Community Development Law, Eco-
nomic Justice, and the Legal Academy, 26 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. AND CMTY DEV. L. 31 (2017) 
(“[N]ew approaches to local development and related lawyering, philosophies underlying 
these new approaches, and dramatic changes in context challenge us to reimagine the 
framework of community economic development.”); Roger A. Clay Jr. and Susan R. Jones, A
Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 
257, 257 (2009) (“It has been described as a strategy that includes a wide range of economic 
activities and programs for developing low-income communities such as affordable housing 
and small business development.”); Michael R. Diamond , Community Economic Development: A 
Reflection on Community, Power and the Law, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 151, 166 (2004) 
(“Community economic development is more than the creation of jobs, the provision of 
goods and services and the accumulation of individual wealth. . . . [It is a process whereby] 
assets are marshaled, institutions built and power acquired and used.”); WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW 
SOCIAL POLICY 3 (Duke Univ. Press 2002) (“[T]he core definition of CED embraces (1) ef-
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framing distinguishes a typology of social change premised on a 
theoretical deconstruction of neoliberalism’s illusion of justice. By 
shifting conceptions of liberty from notions of non-interference to 
standards of non-dominance, the justice-based approach urges ad-
vocates, development practitioners, and lawmakers alike to recon-
sider the political philosophy that underlies predominant ap-
proaches to economic development. By prioritizing human moral 
dignity as fundamental to notions of justice, establishing dignity as 
coextensive with liberty, and elevating political equality as intrinsi-
cally valuable to liberty, justice-based CED places democracy at the 
epicenter of the economic development debate. 
Importantly, the justice-based framing recognizes that America’s 
development challenges are not merely social or economic; they 
are systemic to the very fabric of American political identity, a 
hoary tapestry of ideological, institutional, and epistemological re-
alities woven together by an unwillingness to transcend neoclassical 
economic norms34 or combat neoliberal politics.35 Although emerg-
ing CED models like the SIB appear capable of overcoming the 
troubles of neoliberalism by leveraging capitalism’s inherent profit 
motive to advance social good, this Article argues that the SIB’s 
underlying commitment to the dogma of market fundamental-
ism36—a belief in unregulated economic activity to resolve societal 
inequality—reveals the larger logic of neoliberalism’s entrench-
ment. Conversely, if governments reconsider the economic princi-
ples that lie beneath dominant approaches to CED, new strategies 
                                                   
forts to develop housing, job, or business opportunities for low-income people, (2) in which 
a leading role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (3) that are accounta-
ble to residentially defined communities.”); Cummings, supra note 10, at 35 (“CED law is 
now less a body of activity or doctrine that can be empirically defined or normatively de-
rived, and more a set of basic questions about the content and control of local struggles for 
change, the role and responsibility of a democratic government to promote equality and 
economic security for its people, and the potential of collaboration or conflict to achieve 
deep and sustained structural reforms.”). 
 34. See infra section II.D. 
 35. The term “neoliberalism” defined the 20th century resurgence of 19th century lais-
sez-faire economic liberalization. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 
(2005) (explaining that under neoliberal orthodoxy, “[s]tate interventions in markets (once 
created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot 
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signal (prices) and because 
powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit.”); see also NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFITS OVER PEOPLE:
NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 20 (1999) (explaining that the basic tenets of neoliber-
alism are “liberalize trade and finance, let markets set price (‘get prices right’), end inflation 
(‘macroeconomic stability’), privatize”). 
 36. See West, supra note 7, at 4–5 (explaining that market fundamentalism renders 
“money-driven, poll-obsessed elected officials deferential to corporate goals of profit, often 
at the cost of the common good” while placing “a premium on the activities of buying and 
selling, consuming and taking, promoting and advertising, and devalues community, com-
passionate charity, and improvements of the general quality of life.”). 
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for development will emerge. The justice-based framing points to-
ward the “social and solidarity” economy (SSE or the solidarity 
economy)37 as an alternative approach to economic life that is par-
ticipatory, inclusive, and, perhaps most important, grounded in a 
concern for economic democracy.38 SSE need not replace Ameri-
ca’s capitalist system. Rather, SSE serves as an epistemological chal-
lenge to the capitalist paradigm that shapes our development per-
spective, pushing policymakers to reconsider the philosophical 
principles and fundamental moral values that drive economic 
transformation, thereby targeting the sickness of poverty at the 
root.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief review of the history of 
CED in America, tracing a narrative from the early workings of lo-
calist strategies like Urban Renewal to more recent regionalist 
strategies like Housing Choice Vouchers, and finally ending with 
current blended innovations like the pay-for-success SIB model. 
These CED models have been equally propelled by a neoclassical 
political economy and a neoliberal political ideology that reveals 
an historical unwillingness to incorporate non-market goods (e.g., 
social capital, culture, decision-making power) into mainstream 
theories of economic growth. Part I concludes with a discussion of 
the limitations of these CED models, revealing their role in the rise 
of neoliberal rationality. 
Next, Part II seeks to steer the ongoing CED debate into new wa-
ters by erecting justice as its central mast. Shifting from a historic 
focus on people versus place, it begins by asking the reader to re-
think the concept of justice, recognizing that diverse perspectives 
on liberty drive varied opinions on the demands of justice on our 
political economy, rendering the dominant framing as subjective. 
Then, it frames political equality as a foundational component of 
democracy, revealing how democratizing the ownership of wealth 
furthers the social justice work of the civil rights movement. Part II 
concludes by exploring the guiding tenets of the solidarity econo-
                                                   
 37. See Utting, supra note 14, at 1 (SSE refers to “forms of economic activity that priori-
tize social and often environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers 
and citizens acting collectively and in solidarity . . . [not only] enterprises such as coopera-
tives, mutual associations, grant-dependent and service-delivery non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and community and other forms of volunteering and giving, but also myriad 
types of self-help groups organizing to produce goods and services, fair trade networks and 
other forms of solidarity purchasing, consumer groups involved in collective provisioning, 
associations of ‘informal economy’ workers, new forms of profit-making social enterprises 
and social entrepreneurs, and NGOs that are having to shift from a dependence on dona-
tions and grants to sustaining themselves via income-generating activities.”); see infra section 
III.C.
 38. See Chartier, supra note 20, at 267 (defining “economic democracy” as a combina-
tion of “egalitarian self-government” and “economic justice”) (emphasis omitted). 
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my, which it argues can fuel CED initiatives seeking to transgress 
the limitations of neoliberalism for poverty alleviation. 
Finally, Part III articulates a new justice-based conceptual fram-
ing of CED to guide emerging development strategies toward 
achieving the regional equity goals of the New Regionalist move-
ment. This framing rests upon three foundational pillars—(1) so-
cial solidarity: fostering political equality among members of a 
community to overcome the political construction and racial di-
mensions of state-sponsored privilege; (2) economic democracy: de-
mocratizing the ownership of wealth-generating property to pro-
mote long-term metropolitan equity; and (3) solidarity economy:
crafting empowerment-centered and community-owned institu-
tions to addresses the structural dimensions of systemic poverty. 
Taken together, justice-based CED provides guideposts to steer 
emerging CED programs toward building a world without poverty 
by promoting an inclusive, participatory, and empowerment-driven 
economy. Even more, it reflects a vision of political morality that 
embodies one of America’s most foundational democratic values—
human moral dignity. 
I. THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL RATIONALITY
Diverse perspectives on the role of government in economic life, 
narratives of the relationship between citizens and their communi-
ty, and wide-ranging beliefs about the interplay between economic 
growth and community development have shaped the history of 
community economic development in America. These perspec-
tives, narratives, and beliefs are informed by problematic assump-
tions about race and class that obscure or, at times, elide the trans-
formative potential of CED. Take, for example, my hometown of 
the South Bronx. Several factors converged to make the Bronx an 
economically and racially marginalized community. First, like oth-
er urban areas across America, the Bronx experienced the “white 
flight” of white middle-class residents to opportunity-rich suburbs. 
Second, frustrated by new rent control policies, landlords aban-
doned housing developments across the city. Third, the massive 
construction of interstate highways financed by federal subsidies 
plunged a primarily working-class community into steady decay.39
These factors, among other social forces, transformed the Bronx 
during the twentieth century.
                                                   
 39. See generally Omar Freilla, Burying Robert Moses’s Legacy in New York City, in HIGHWAY 
ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 77–78 (2004). 
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By the 1970s, the Bronx would be described as “burning,” a 
community riddled with abandoned apartment buildings, persis-
tent crime, and rising homicide rates.40 Stunted economic devel-
opment and limited educational opportunities characterized an 
overwhelming number of neighborhoods across the borough.41
Moreover, public health declined due to the devastating impact of 
the crack cocaine epidemic.42 By the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Bronx witnessed both a pervasive gang culture and the persistence 
of concentrated poverty.43 Stereotypical and racialized narratives of 
the Bronx blame low-income residents for these dynamic changes. 
However, conventional narratives of poverty obscure a complex 
history replete with instances of state-sponsored racial segregation 
and massive resistance to integration that together created a geog-
raphy of economic inequality.44 Worse still, this story is evident in 
cities across America, the byproduct of a textured history of CED 
experimentation that has undermined the collective voice and in-
dividual dignity of the poor. Today, CED policies in America reveal 
an entrenchment of neoliberal values that undermine poverty alle-
viation. 
A. Historical Origins 
Throughout American history, political leaders, legal scholars, 
and public policy advocates have been divided on the appropriate 
focus of laws and public policies designed to address poverty in 
marginalized communities. After the emancipation of enslaved Af-
ricans in 1865,45 creating a nation of nominally free citizens living 
in racially segregated communities with unequal access to social 
mobility, some political leaders began advocating for a welfare 
state political system, whereby the government would take a proac-
tive role in protecting the social and economic well-being of her 
                                                   
 40. See Winnie Hu, Fighting the Image of the ‘Burning’ Borough, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013, at 
A13.
 41.  Cf. id.
 42. See Gene Mustain, When the Crack Scourge Swept New York City, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/crack-scourge-swept-new-york-city-article-
1.813844. 
 43. See generally Edwin J. Torres, Bronx Cheer: The New York Borough that Once Symbolized 
Urban Decline Is Safer and More stable–But Most Bronxites’ Lives Are Still Precarious, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Oct. 12, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/how-bronx-came-back-didnt-bring-
everyone-along. 
 44. See Edward C. Burks, Bronx Rate of Poverty Is Highest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1972, at 37 
(“Of every 100 Bronx families, 15 were living below the poverty level in 1970.”). 
 45. U. S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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citizens.46 Alternatively, others argued for a more conservative, ‘lib-
ertarian’ approach to governance, whereby state power would be 
minimized and individual rights would reign supreme.47 Propo-
nents of the latter libertarian political order encouraged a ‘laissez-
faire’ style of capitalism that relied upon the private market to cor-
rect economic failures and on individual action to address social 
inequality.48
This dichotomy manifests in the historic dialogue between 
Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois during the early 1900s 
regarding the best strategies to aid formerly enslaved Africans in 
resisting Jim Crow racial subordination and attaining social and 
economic equality.49 Booker T. Washington advocated an “eco-
nomic nationalist” approach to social empowerment that priori-
tized economic self-sufficiency for black Americans through prop-
erty and business ownership.50 Washington believed that black 
Americans needed to first establish a thriving black economic in-
frastructure to serve as the foundation for political demands.51
Conversely, W.E.B. Du Bois rose to national prominence as a civil 
rights leader in the movement for racial equality under the law, a 
political movement that he believed would be quickened by the 
leadership of the black intellectual elite, or the “Talented Tenth.”52
For Du Bois, the self-help approach of Washington expressed an 
                                                   
 46. From the Civil War period until the end of Reconstruction in 1877, a group of 
American politicians known as the Radical Republicans and led by John C. Fremont, Charles 
Sumner, and Thaddeus Stevens—to name a few—pioneered efforts to establish civil rights 
for formerly enslaved Africans or African descendants, including the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act, the 1868 Eight Hour Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Such 
political efforts seen by some as a justifiable form of state-sponsored “reparations” for the 
nation’s widespread endorsement of chattel slavery for the 200 years prior. See generally
HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS 
IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901 (2004). 
 47. Libertarianism emphasizes individual autonomy and freedom of choice, while call-
ing for the restriction or dissolution of social institutions. The political philosophy melded 
with the white supremacist views of the Redeemers, as well as the conservative and pro-
business southern wing of the Bourbon Democrats who staunchly opposed the public wel-
fare programs of the Reconstruction era. Cf. JOHN C. RODRIGUE, RECONSTRUCTION IN THE 
CANE FIELDS: FROM SLAVERY TO FREE LABOR IN LOUISIANA’S SUGAR PARISHES, 1862–1880, 168 
(2001).
 48. See generally Harvey, supra note 35, at 7 (“The assumption that individual freedoms 
are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal 
thinking, and it has long dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world.”). 
 49. See W.E.B. Du Bois, Of Mr. Booker T Washington and Others, in THE SOULS OF BLACK 
FOLK 62–72 (David W. Blight & Robert Gooding-Williams, eds., Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 
1997) (1903); Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New Mil-
lennium—Revisiting the Washington-DuBois Dialectic, 42 HOW. L.J. 391, 394–99 (1999). 
 50. Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a 
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410–11 (2001). 
 51. See id. at 410. 
 52. See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM (James Pott & Co., 
1903). 
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attitude of “acquiescent submission”—a voluntary surrendering of 
self-respect that diminished the dignity of black Americans.53 In-
stead, Du Bois urged a “militant, self-respecting self-assertion di-
rected against racial prejudice and racial injustice,” a moral stance 
later embraced by civil rights activist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.54
Washington and Du Bois differed on their ideological beliefs 
about black socio-economic empowerment. Washington favored a 
market-oriented approach (albeit, a segregated market where 
black businesses faced the threat of racial terrorism) that deem-
phasized political engagement, and Du Bois advanced a political 
strategy that prioritized the removal of systemic barriers to social 
and economic mobility.55 Notwithstanding, both men agreed that 
economic justice for black communities was a necessary compo-
nent of black liberation.56 Thus, they shared a fundamental belief 
in the value of black business ownership and the power of collec-
tive community engagement in the democratic process. In their 
view, CED demanded a liberated economic market where notions 
of race and class did not constrain human flourishing. Indeed, Du 
Bois proposed the organization of black-owned cooperatives dur-
ing the later years of his life, drawing him closer to the ideology of 
Washington, and connecting him, in some ways, to the emigration-
ist politics of leaders like Marcus Garvey.57
Despite the thoughtful engagement of early public intellectuals 
like Washington and Du Bois, economic development was largely 
viewed by political leaders as a byproduct of economic growth poli-
cies. As a result, early economic development programs spear-
headed by the federal government adopted a place-based, localist 
approach to poverty alleviation that experimented with various 
                                                   
 53. Robert Gooding-Williams, The Du Bois-Washington Debate and the Idea of Dignity, in TO
SHAPE A NEW WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21 
(Tommie Shelby & Brandon M. Terry eds., 2018) [hereinafter TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD].
 54. See id. This position also reflects a viewpoint espoused by early abolitionist Frederick 
Douglass. See Williams L. Andrews, FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM
(University of Illinois Press, 1987) (1855) (“A man without force is without the essential 
dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted that it cannot honor a helpless man, 
although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not 
arise.”). 
 55. See John Albert Foster-Bey, Jr., “Don’t Want Nobody to Give Me Nothing”: An As-
sessment of Black Community Self-Help 8–9 (Apr. 19, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Geo. U.) (on file with Geo. U.), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/
bitstream/handle/10822/557677/FosterBey_georgetown_0076D_11846.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y. 
 56. See HAROLD MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW THEORY OF COMMUNITY 12–14 
(1993).
 57. Marcus Garvey advocated black independence from a primarily white-owned eco-
nomic market through the establishment of Black-owned business cooperatives. Cummings, 
supra note 50, at 411–12. 
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economic growth strategies.58 As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the 
federal government began sponsoring “slum” clearance programs 
in cities across the country.59 By the 1940s and 1950s, these pro-
grams became known as “Urban Renewal,”60 directing public sub-
sidies into the pockets of private developers to encourage the crea-
tion of affordable housing for low-income residents and business 
development for blighted urban neighborhoods.61 These strategies 
were supported by local governments because residential and 
commercial infrastructure projects promised measurable risk pro-
files and quantifiable financial returns, creating safe investments 
that, over time, could attract more capital from private investors.62
The place-based CED model meshed with localist perspectives on 
local government law that “normalize[d] and entrenche[d] citi-
                                                   
 58. Economic development programs have historically focused on mobilizing human 
and financial capital to attract business investment and development in targeted urban 
communities. See Crowder, supra note 21, at 572–73. While legal scholars and historians of 
urban development often locate the origins of economic development in the early 1900s, 
and the origins of “community” economic development in the Civil Rights Movement of the 
1950s-1970s, the development of government programs to address social inequality has ear-
lier roots. In 1865, President Abraham Lincoln established the Freedman’s Bureau, an 
agency of the United States Department of War to “direct such issues of provisions, clothing, 
and fuel, as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of 
destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their wives and children.” See An Act to 
Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865). Un-
fortunately, due to the rise of Ku Klux Klan terrorism and political opposition to public wel-
fare assistance for formerly enslaved Africans, the agency was removed. See Veto of the Freed-
men’s Bureau Bill, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/
historyculture/freedmens-bureau.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2015) (noting the veto of Pres-
ident Andrew Johnson, who felt that the Freedmen’s Bureau was “‘class legislation’ for a 
particular segment of society that: a. Would keep the ex-slaves from being self-sustaining, 
and b. Had not been done for struggling whites (like he had been as an ex-apprentice).”) 
 59. See, e.g., ROBERT B. FAIRBANKS, THE WAR ON SLUMS IN THE SOUTHWEST: PUBLIC 
HOUSING AND SLUM CLEARANCE IN TEXAS, ARIZONA, AND NEW MEXICO, 1935–1965 (2014);
McFarlane supra note 21, at 317. 
 60. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 332 (“[U]rban renewal certainly allowed cities to 
transform their economies in the light of the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, [but] a 
great many of the newly created jobs benefitted primarily suburban commuters. . . . [Urban 
Renewal] often eliminated poor and working class neighborhoods and replaced them with 
high-rise, luxury structures for the more affluent while concentrating public housing sites 
within black neighborhoods.”). 
 61. Many contend that these policies did not wrestle with the most important drivers of 
urban poverty. Indeed, many scholars now agree that low-income neighborhoods were the 
product of racial isolation policies coupled with intentional government neglect. See Susan 
Bennett, The Possibility of a Beloved Place: Residents and Placemaking in Public Housing Communi-
ties, 19 SAINT LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 262 (2000), [hereinafter Beloved Place] (“By architec-
tural and political design, public housing complexes began their history in racial and geo-
graphical isolation, an isolation intensified over the years by demographic shifts, labor and 
housing market forces, and vicissitudes of federal housing policy. Atrocious management 
and withdrawal of federal financial support for maintenance made of many complexes no-
torious hellholes that replicated the worst features of the early twentieth century slums that 
they were built to replace.”). 
 62. See generally Keohane, supra note 30, at 156–57. 
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zens’ private, market-based, racial, and economic preferences.”63
Such preferences often resulted in a “deficiency-oriented” perspec-
tive of low-income urban neighborhoods, reinforcing negative 
opinions of urban culture and racial stereotypes stemming from an 
ideology of white supremacy.64 In many cities across America, in-
cluding my hometown of the Bronx, large sections of low-income 
minority neighborhoods were demolished and replaced with parks, 
office buildings, and highways that connected the newly improved 
areas to low-poverty, predominantly white suburbs.65 As Sheryll 
Cashin explains, this method of development resulted in a “tyran-
ny of the favored quarter”66—the birth of suburban rings that 
reaped the benefits of economic development while externalizing 
the costs and burdens to inner city slums.67
Our modern, multidimensional conception of community eco-
nomic development largely emerged during the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1950s to 1970s. Building upon the legacy of 
W.E.B. Du Bois, pioneering civil rights leaders like Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. helped to launch a people-based, grassroots political 
action movement to end racial oppression and attain economic 
justice for black Americans.68 Notwithstanding Dr. King’s visible 
commitment to political activism, the economic nationalism of 
Booker T. Washington remained an important strategy of the civil 
rights movement, principally because its leaders recognized that 
dismantling Jim Crow laws would not immediately address the ma-
terial needs of low-income black communities, much less yield a 
sense of human moral dignity.69 Indeed, in 1968, shortly before his 
assassination, Dr. King launched the Poor People’s Campaign as a 
hallmark of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s eco-
nomic justice strategy, demanding an economic “Bill of Rights” 
that sought to integrate the ownership of wealth through progres-
                                                   
 63. See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustain-
able Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 639 (2011), [hereinafter New Regionalist Ap-
proaches]. 
 64. See Beloved Place, supra note 61, at 270–71 (arguing that the “[p]opular conception 
that community cannot grow in public housing has been reinforced by best-selling ‘hero 
stories’” that present decaying communities “without even the possibility of redemption.”). 
 65. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 318 (“This approach to revitalization entailed re-
placing low-income neighborhoods, which were often black, with highways, sterile housing 
developments, and municipal office complexes, an approach which became known as “Ne-
gro removal.”). 
 66. See Cashin, supra note 26, at 2003. 
 67. See id. at 2003–04. 
 68. See generally THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2006). 
 69. See Progressive Politics, supra note 50, at 414; see also Tommie Shelby, Prisons of the For-
gotten: Ghettos and Economic Justice, in TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 189. (“King 
argued that ghetto social problems are rooted in economic disadvantage, particularly in un-
employment, low wages, and restriction to menial labor.”). 
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sive political reform.70 King believed that the civil rights movement 
was not only a call for the recognition of black American dignity 
through equal civil rights, but also a demand for black liberation 
through economic justice.71 Other prominent civil rights leaders, 
such as el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz (formerly Malcolm X), believed 
the equal inclusion of black Americans into the social and eco-
nomic fabric of American life was not only essential to their human 
moral dignity, but was a matter of fundamental human rights.72
As civil rights organizations began orienting their grassroots po-
litical activism toward economic justice for racially segregated and 
socially oppressed low-income black communities, the federal gov-
ernment simultaneously began developing people-based policy 
frameworks targeting the concentration of poverty in public hous-
ing developments. Inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s New 
Frontier domestic programs, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
launched the “Great Society” programs as part of his “War on Pov-
erty” to eliminate poverty and racial injustice through an expan-
sion of the welfare state.73 President Johnson codified the Commu-
nity Action Program (CAP) under the Economic Opportunity Act 
of 1964 (EOA), which created the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO).74 The OEO coordinated various work experience and 
study programs, including Job Corps and Volunteers in Service to 
America, and various community action agencies, including Head 
Start.75 However, CAP’s emphasis on creating community action 
agencies (CAAs) that relied upon the “maximum feasible partici-
pation” of poor citizens threatened the existing power structure of 
                                                   
 70. See generally GERALD MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE 
FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN (1998); GORDON KEITH MANTLER, POWER TO THE 
POOR: BLACK-BROWN COALITION AND THE FIGHT FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1960–1974 (2013). 
 71. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 10 (Signet Classics 2000) (1964) 
(“Equality meant dignity and dignity demanded a job that was secure and a paycheck that 
lasted throughout the week.”). 
 72. See MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 275 (Bal-
lantine Books 1965) (“Respect as human beings! That’s what America’s black masses want. . . . 
They want not to be walled up in slums, in the ghettoes, like animals. They want to live in an 
open, free society where they can walk with their heads up, like men, and women!”). 
 73. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 42 (“Johnson’s Great Society programs included job 
training, housing, food stamps, and other forms of assistance that inadvertently helped to 
define Black inequality as primarily an economic question.”). 
 74. The Community Action Program aimed to increase local control over CED initia-
tives and antipoverty programs. Community action agencies, administered in part by com-
munity residents, were delegated authority to implement programs in the areas of health, 
job training, housing, social services, and economic development. See Economic Opportuni-
ty Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed 1981). 
 75. See generally Martha J. Bailey & Nicolas J. Duquette, How Johnson Fought the War on 
Poverty: The Economics and Politics of Funding at the Office of Economic Opportunity, 74 J. OF ECON.
HIST. 351 (2014). 
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local government leaders.76 Facing political pressure to preserve 
the status quo, in 1966 President Johnson created the Model Cities 
program, a government-led comprehensive anti-poverty framework 
designed to address social inequities across urban communities.77
In 1967, Congress passed the Quie Amendment to the EOA, which 
stipulated that one-third of CAAs must comprise elected officials, 
while another third must comprise private sector representatives, 
reducing the representation of marginalized, low-income residents 
to one-third.78 This modified management structure both silenced 
the poor and stripped them of their “censorial power.”79 Also in 
1967, Congress passed the Green Amendment to the EOA, which 
enabled governments to begin withdrawing funding from existing 
independent CAAs and prioritize city-controlled CAAs or public 
agencies.80 Unsurprisingly, the Model Cities program encountered 
challenges with funding and struggled to redefine Urban Renew-
al.81 CAAs were eventually replaced by community development 
corporations (CDCs), non-profit entities committed to serving 
marginalized communities.82 Since their creation, CDCs have been 
instrumental in implementing community development programs 
in neighborhoods across America. Yet, they remain relatively few 
and far between.83 Notwithstanding efforts by the federal govern-
ment to spur community development through Urban Renewal 
and the Great Society programs, the federal government ultimately 
faced criticism for instituting a largely anti-participatory, top-down 
development process that failed to democratically engage low-
                                                   
 76. Milton Kotler, The Politics of Community Development, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 
(1971).
 77. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 318–19 (explaining that the neighborhood-based 
Model Cities programs were developed partially in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1965 
and sought to coordinate the many governmental anti-poverty programs while giving com-
munity members a more active role in their design and implementation.). 
 78. See Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 211, 81 
Stat. 693 (1967). 
 79. As James Madison explained in a letter to James Monroe, “[T]he censorial power is 
in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.” Letter 
from James Madison, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia, to James 
Monroe, U.S. Minister to France (Dec. 4, 1794), https://www.loc.gov/resource/
mjm.05_0799_0804/?sp=2&st=text. 
 80. See Kotler, supra note 76, at 3. 
 81. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 319. 
 82. The 1966 Special Impact Program amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 established the allocation of federal funding to support CDCs. See Cummings, supra
note 50, at 415. 
 83. See Alexander von Hoffman, The Past, Present, and Future of Community Development,
SHELTERFORCE (Jul. 17, 2013), https://shelterforce.org/2013/07/17/the_past_present_
and_future_of_community_development/ (“CDCs during the 1980s and 1990s sparked re-
vivals in inner-city neighborhoods from coast to coast. In the Roxbury and Dorchester 
neighborhoods of Boston, on the West Side of Chicago, in South Central Los Angeles, savvy 
CDC directors helped fill in the unsightly and dangerous vacant lots and buildings on their 
streets.”).
WINTER 2019] Dismantling the Master’s House 355
income community members or provide equal access to economic 
opportunities.84 After Richard Nixon became president in 1969, his 
administration transferred many of the OEO’s programs to other 
federal departments before eventually defunding the OEO’s CAP 
division.85 In 1975, President Gerald Ford closed the OEO com-
pletely and replaced it with the Community Service Administration 
(CSA).86
The 1960s and 1970s also saw the rise of regionalism—the belief 
that neighboring local governments should work together to com-
bat the regional dimensions of inequality and racial segregation.87
Indeed, the U.S. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 mandated the 
formation of metropolitan governing bodies to facilitate transpor-
tation planning for interstate highway construction.88 Further, the 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 encouraged the cre-
ation of elected regional councils of government and metropolitan 
planning organizations to help address the regional dimensions of 
poverty.89 However, the end of the civil rights era, coupled with 
staunch resistance from many white citizens who championed their 
local autonomy to exclude people of color from their neighbor-
hoods, saw the federal government shift much of the responsibility 
for administering redevelopment programs to the state and local 
                                                   
 84. Famed writer and public intellectual, James Baldwin, described the phenomenon of 
Urban Renewal by stating, 
A boy last week, he was sixteen, in San Francisco, told me on television — thank 
God we got him to talk — maybe somebody thought to listen. He said, “I’ve got 
no country. I’ve got no flag.” Now, he’s only 16 years old, and I couldn’t say, “you 
do.” I don’t have any evidence to prove that he does. They were tearing down his 
house, because San Francisco is engaging — as most Northern cities now are en-
gaged — in something called urban renewal, which means moving the Negroes 
out. It means Negro removal, that is what it means. The federal government is an 
accomplice to this fact. 
A Conversation with James Baldwin, Perspectives: Negro and the American Promise (WGBH televi-
sion broadcast Jun. 10, 1963), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8Abhj17kYU. See also, 
e.g., Scott Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s Competitive Advantage 
Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 912 (2003) (“Urban Renewal became associated with clearing 
away “slums” adjacent to downtown business areas, resulting in massive displacement and 
resegregation in other urban neighborhoods. Public housing built for these displaced resi-
dents was frequently located by design in racially and economically segregated neighbor-
hoods.”); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses 
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003). 
 85. Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 1089, 1094–95 (2002). 
 86. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145 (1962). 
 87. See Briffault, supra note 24, at 1133–41 (explaining how local government actions in 
suburban localities can, in the aggregate, impose burdens on the central city). 
 88. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145. 
 89. See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 642. 
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levels.90 The idea of regional governance eventually began to lose 
steam, and, during the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began sanc-
tioning exclusionary zoning powers in many suburban communi-
ties.91 In 1974, the Model Cities Program was terminated by Presi-
dent Gerald Ford and replaced by the Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) Program.92 CDBG allocates discretionary 
funding to states and municipalities through the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to facilitate community revitali-
zation programs.93 The emergence of the CDBG Program, followed 
by the Urban Development Action Grants Program instituted un-
der President Jimmy Carter,94 reflected the shifting of decision-
making authority down to the local level. By the 1980s, President 
Ronald Reagan would dismantle many of the federal requirements 
for regional review bodies altogether.95 Further, he would repeal 
the EOA of 1964 and abolish the Community Service Administra-
tion, transitioning its funding to Community Service Block Grants 
administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.
Despite political reluctance to embrace regional government, in 
the rich tradition of W.E.B. Du Bois and earlier civil rights leaders, 
social justice advocates and community organizers, such as Saul 
Alinsky,96 continued to use grassroots political activism to advance a 
broad-based and redistributive economic development agenda.97
Building upon a history of community-based activism in the black 
community, Alinsky sought to create “cross-racial alliances for eco-
nomic justice” that shifted the development conversation beyond 
the boundaries of local neighborhoods.98 In 1967, George Wiley 
formed the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) to urge 
                                                   
 90. See Crowder, supra note 21, at 574 (explaining this shift was “based on the premise 
that state and local government should have a better awareness of their local assets and eco-
nomic development needs”); see generally MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW 
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, ONE
WORLD/BALLANTINE (2005); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
 91. See Troutt, supra note 26, at 1147–48. 
 92. See Community Development Block Grant Program — CDBG, HUD, 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/progra
ms (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 93. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 101, 
88 Stat. 633, (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2001)). 
 94. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 119, 
91, Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2001)). 
 95. See Briffault, supra note 24, at 1148. 
 96. Through the Industrial Areas Foundation, Saul Alinsky worked to “build local pow-
er, cultivate indigenous leadership, and mobilize the poor.” Cummings, supra note 50, at 
417. 
 97. See id. at 417–18. 
 98. See id. at 418 & n.77. 
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the federal government to reform the economic system and ex-
pand welfare benefits for millions of low-income Americans.99 Seek-
ing a broader reform agenda, Wiley eventually left NWRO to form 
the Movement for Economic Justice, a multiracial grassroots coali-
tion of welfare recipients, the working poor, and the middle class, 
all organized around various economic justice issues.100 Similarly, in 
1970 Wade Rathke, formerly of NWRO, founded the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) as a multi-
racial and multiclass organization dedicated toward a suite of eco-
nomic justice issues affecting poor and working class popula-
tions.101
Although the civil rights era exposed the broad impact of sys-
temic racial discrimination and the regional dimensions of ine-
quality, as detailed in the 1968 Kerner Commission report,102 a 
post-civil rights political framework of “colorblindness” provided 
the theoretical foundation for conservative politicians to begin 
rolling back the welfare state and its focus on economic justice.103
Decades of racially-motivated disinvestment and under-resourcing 
had contributed to the abysmal living conditions in many low-
income black communities. Yet, a politics of colorblindness 
shrouded institutional racism and reduced the economic crisis of 
the early 1970s as simply the natural consequence of moral decay, 
urban criminality, and a toxic culture of poverty.104
                                                   
 99. See id. at 418. For example, through targeted advocacy, NWRO was able to defeat 
President Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, which sought to replace Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). See Clay & Jones, supra note 33, at 262. 
 100. See Cummings, supra note 50, at 420. 
 101. Some of these issues included “special needs welfare programs, tax reform, generic 
drug pricing, ‘lifeline’ electric rates, and property taxes.” Id. at 420–21. By the 1970s, 
ACORN entered local electoral politics to advocate a poor people’s agenda that included 
issues such as the elimination of the state income tax for low-income individuals. See id. at 
420. 
 102. See KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS (1967), http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf; see also
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 52 (“The 1968 Kerner Commission report’s detailed descriptions of 
racial discrimination by public and private institutions had established a basis upon which 
African Americans could stake a claim to federal aid.”). 
 103. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Color-
blindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (tracing the evolution of colorblindness in America). 
 104. See Oscar Lewis, Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES 
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 199 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1969) (“The subculture [of the 
poor] develops mechanisms that tend to perpetuate it, especially because of what happens 
to the worldview, aspirations, and character of the children who grow up in it.”); TAYLOR,
supra note 6, at 53, 71 (quoting George Romney, President Richard Nixon’s first secretary of 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as stating, “Housing by itself cannot 
solve the problems of people . . . who may be suffering from bad habits, lawlessness, laziness, 
unemployment, inadequate education, low working skills, ill heath, poor motivation and a 
negative self-image.”); WILLIAM DARITY JR., ET AL., WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING 
THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2018), https://insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/
Where-We-Went-Wrong-COMPLETE-REPORT-July-2018.pdf (“This belief was magnified by 
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The emergence of a “neoconservative” political agenda105 during 
the administration of President Ronald Reagan led to a transition 
from the people-based, regional political activism advanced by 
groups such as NWRO and ACORN toward predominately place-
based, localist, and neoliberal public welfare programs.106 Under 
President Reagan’s fiscally conservative political program of supply-
side “trickle-down” economics, the government strengthened its 
market-based approach to economic development.107 Unfortunate-
ly, market-based programs like the Low Income Housing Tax Cred-
it (LIHTC),108 a mainstay in affordable housing development, have 
shown limited evidence of reducing poverty in low-income neigh-
borhoods. In fact, some studies suggest that the LIHTC has in-
creased poverty concentration and furthered racial segregation.109
The neoliberal political project continued under the administra-
tion of President Bill Clinton. Its ‘free market’ political program of 
economic liberalization—focused on reducing taxes for the 
wealthy, increasing international trade, deregulating global finan-
cial and capital markets, privatizing public enterprises, reforming 
the welfare system110 and cutting spending on entitlement pro-
                                                   
Ronald Reagan’s use of the ‘welfare queen’ trope during his campaign, and, recently, via 
internet financial gurus pushing images of black American spending money on Jordan 
brand Nike shoes, rather than household needs.”). 
 105. The term “neoconservative” was popularized during the 1960s and early 1970s by 
those who rejected the countercultural politics of the New Left, such as President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Great Society programs, and the pacifist approach to foreign policy, such as the 
Vietnam War protests. Cf. Jonah Goldberg, The Neoconservative Invention, NAT’L REV.
(May 20, 2003), https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/05/neoconservative-invention-
jonah-goldberg/. 
 106. See Cummings, supra note 50, at 421–22. 
 107. See id. at 423–24. 
 108. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the federal government created the Low In-
come Housing Tax Credit program (“LIHTC”), which provides tax credits to encourage pri-
vate developers to build affordable rental housing for low-income Americans. Since its crea-
tion, the federal program has helped to finance housing for more than 2.4 million 
affordable rental-housing units. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012); see also David Philip Cohen, Im-
proving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role of The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 537 (1998).
 109. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2514 (2015) (prompted by a lawsuit claiming that the Texas Department of Housing 
and Community Affairs was funding LIHTC developments in predominantly minority, high-
poverty neighborhoods). But see Ingrid G. Ellen et. al., Poverty Concentration and the Low In-
come Housing Tax Credit: Effects of Siting and Tenant Composition, 34 J. HOUS. ECON. 49, 58 
(2016) (noting that there is little evidence that LIHTC concentrates poverty, and some evi-
dence that LIHTC reduces poverty rates). 
 110. Under the Clinton Administration, reform meant a bill that abolished the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it with Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families (TANF). TANF imposes mandatory work requirements and strict 
term limits on welfare recipients. See Cummings, supra note 50, at 425–26. 
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grams111—aimed to create market conditions for businesses to help 
resolve the issues facing low-income communities through private 
investments. Initiatives such as the HOPE VI program112 and the 
Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities Demonstration pro-
gram113 sought to expand business activity in distressed, low-income 
communities by offering tax benefits to employers in pre-defined 
zones. In 1994, the Clinton administration instituted the Commu-
nity Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund under the 
United States Department of the Treasury. The CDFI Fund has 
promoted commercial real estate development and small business 
development in many low-income communities since its inception. 
Yet, the wealth gap has persisted.114 In the year 2000, President 
Clinton created the New Market Tax Credit Program115 to incentiv-
ize the private sector to invest in businesses located in low-income 
communities and help revitalize economic activity. Despite these 
praiseworthy efforts to catalyze community development by lever-
aging private sector capital, scholars argue that these programs 
have largely failed to improve social and economic conditions for 
low-income black communities across America.116
Both the administrations of President George W. Bush and Pres-
ident Barack Obama continued the steady march of neoliberalism 
with market-based initiatives like the Choice Neighborhoods pro-
                                                   
 111. See Sheldon Danzinger, Welfare Reform Policy from Nixon to Clinton: What Role for Social 
Science?, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY-MAKING: A SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 137, 147-150 (David Lee Featherman ed., 2001). 
 112. Under the HOPE VI program (enacted under the Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 
75–412, § 24, 50 Stat. 888, 899, amended by Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 
1998, 42 USC § 1437v) and later the Choice Neighborhoods grant program, the federal 
government provided public subsidies to private developers to redevelop struggling public 
housing developments into new high-quality mixed-income developments. See Choice Neigh-
borhoods, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/cn. 
 113. In 1993, Congress created the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities Demon-
stration Program, which was designed to create jobs and stimulate business investments in 
economically distressed urban communities through a combination of grant and tax credits. 
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 296–97. The zones were designed to be areas of democratic 
governance and participatory community decision-making. See id.
 114. See Clay & Jones, supra note 33, at 264. 
 115. Established as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, the New 
Markets Tax Credit Program sought to incentivize commercial and mixed-use real estate 
investments in distressed, low-income communities through a federal tax credit. Adminis-
tered by the US Treasury Department’s Community Development Financial Institution 
Fund and allocated by local Community Development Entities (CDEs) across America, the 
NMTC awarded $1 billion in allocation to CDEs during the first year of the program, ena-
bling investors to reduce their federal tax liability by $390 million (39% of the amount in-
vested into CDEs) over a seven-year period. Cf. Janet Thompson Jackson, Can Free Enterprise 
Cure Urban Ills? Lost Opportunities for Business Development in Urban, Low-Income Communities 
Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 659, 662–63, 693–94 
(2007).
 116. See id. at 700–04 (arguing that NMTC would be more effective if benefits were allo-
cated to businesses owned by community members). 
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gram (the next generation of the HOPE VI public housing pro-
gram).117 In 2010, the Obama administration took noteworthy steps 
to revive the legacy of regional development through the Sustaina-
ble Communities Regional Planning Grant Program.118 However, as 
Lisa Alexander reveals, the program may struggle to achieve equi-
table development due to flaws in its design.119 More recently, Pres-
ident Donald Trump’s tax reforms mark not only the continued 
entrenchment of neoliberal politics at the expense of the welfare 
state, but also signal a return to the ‘trickle-down’ economic strate-
gy that defined the Reagan era. Such a move could threaten re-
gional approaches to CED once again.120 Indeed, in the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017, the Trump administration established the 
Opportunity Zones incentive, a bipartisan effort to spur long-term 
private sector investments in low-income communities nation-
wide.121 Although labeled by political leaders as a promising solu-
tion to the increased poverty concentration and hypergentrifica-
tion that has overwhelmed many cities since the early 2000s,122
history forewarns that the neoliberal and market-oriented Oppor-
tunity Zones program merely promises more of the same.123
It would be hasty to conclude that the various market-based 
economic development programs described above have not bene-
fited marginalized communities throughout America’s history. 
Building affordable housing and encouraging the creation of sus-
tainable businesses are both key elements of bringing goods, ser-
vices, and jobs to low-income communities.124 Further, it would be 
                                                   
 117. CARL GRODACH & RENIA EHRENFEUCHT, URBAN REVITALIZATION: REMAKING CITIES 
IN A CHANGING WORLD (2016). 
 118. See Alexander, supra note 63, at 631. 
 119. See id. at 660–73. 
 120. See Peter S. Goodman & Patricia Cohen, It Started as a Tax Cut, Now It Could Change 
American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/
business/republican-tax-cut.html (noting President Trump’s recent tax legislation “could 
constrain the ability of states and local governments to levy their own taxes, pressuring them 
to limit spending on health care, education, public transportation and social services.”). 
 121. See Investing in Opportunity Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018). 
 122. See, e.g., Laura Bliss, The New York That Belonged to the City, CITYLAB (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/08/vanishing-new-york-gentrification/537126/ (“Where 
immigrants, minorities, radicals, queers, runaways, and everyday workers once built an is-
land of tolerance, grit, and creative verve . . . tourists, college bros, and the superrich now 
occupy a bland-ified fortress of consumption.”); Tanvi Misra, From Gentrification to Decline: 
How Neighborhoods Really Change, CITYLAB (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/
equity/2019/04/gentrified-cities-neighborhood-change-displacement-poverty-data/586840/
?fbclid=IwAR3BX1_DN3rZZkc47ZnHl3bzKWiS9ha0L6cqYcdVQ0t1zlxKS_yrfU4cAJM (“But 
across U.S. metros, gentrification may not be the dominant type of urban change. Instead, 
it’s the concentration of poverty—particularly in the suburbs—that’s the type of transfor-
mation most Americans have been experiencing.”). 
 123. Timothy Weaver, The Problem with Opportunity Zones, CITYLAB (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/the-problem-with-opportunity-zones/560510/. 
 124. The diversity of opinion on the costs and benefits of various economic development 
programs reflect a larger conversation about the role of the private market in addressing 
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rash to suggest that each of the presidential administrations dis-
cussed above have equally advanced a neoliberal political agenda 
with the intent of benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the 
poor.125 Certainly, politics plays an ongoing role in the nature and 
shape of America’s political economy, and most would concede 
that our highest elected officials lead with the best of intentions. 
Instead, this Article argues that the market fundamentalism guid-
ing the varied place-based and people-based CED models through 
American history—commonly linking poverty alleviation to the 
economic benefit of private investors—has not only undermined 
the public welfare role of the government,126 but has facilitated a 
hegemonic shift toward a neoliberal rationality in community de-
velopment.
B. Progressive Critiques 
There have been various critiques of place-based and people-
based models of CED. Scholars from the law and economics 
movement have argued that localist, place-based lawmaking is eco-
nomically inefficient, generating high transaction costs and pro-
ducing negative “spillover effects” to unsubsidized stakeholders in 
neighboring localities.127 These scholars maintain that place-based 
CED policies have historically failed to empower residents of mar-
ginalized communities and conclude that their social benefits do 
                                                   
poverty in America. Michael Porter, in a 1995 Harvard Business Review article entitled, “The 
Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” urged a move away from social welfare programs 
toward a development agenda that created opportunities for the private market to bring 
needed goods, services, and jobs to low-income neighborhoods. This market-based ap-
proach called for minimizing the influence of government oversight and overbearing com-
munity demands. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARV. BUS.
J. 55 (1995). However, as Scott Cummings argues, while Porter’s competitive advantage the-
sis may help grow urban economies, “Porter’s approach suffers from two weaknesses: the 
failure to connect his market-based model to the political realities of urban development 
and the lack of attention paid to distributive consequences.” See Cummings, supra note 84, at 
902. 
 125. Indeed, there have been important nuances in political strategy, dynamic narratives 
of policy negotiation, praiseworthy efforts toward bipartisan proposals, and even instances of 
progressive legislation passed by each of the previous political administrations, a discussion 
beyond the scope of this Article, but one that merits noting nonetheless. 
 126. See Etienne C. Toussaint, The New Gospel of Wealth: On Social Impact Bonds and the Pri-
vatization of Public Good, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 219 (2018); see also Crowder, supra note 21, at 
574 (“[W]hat used to be a largely public function still has its roots in the public sphere but is 
now influence by a private profit motive. . . . upending the original intent of economic de-
velopment.”). 
 127. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 983, 996-1002 (2012) (arguing that mixed-income housing projects, while superior 
to the traditional public housing model, are inferior to the provision of portable housing 
vouchers to needy tenants).
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not outweigh their economic costs.128 These assertions become 
readily visible when one considers the common attributes of place-
based CED programs.129
Under the place-based model of CED, the conception of place is 
limited, focused less on the latent social infrastructure of marginal-
ized communities and more on the untapped investment potential 
of built infrastructure for corporate stakeholders. Guided by a pro-
business approach to economic development, the notion of owner-
ship is also limited, focused primarily on generating assets to be 
owned by the financial elite, with little attention devoted toward 
carving out opportunities for community ownership, or honoring 
existing non-market ties to community. As a result, the return on 
capital investment from place-based CED programs have often 
flowed out of marginalized communities rather than into the pock-
ets of community residents. This limited, neoliberal approach to 
CED is exacerbated by a limited focus on inclusion. Since many of 
the institutional development organizations, social service provid-
ers, and investment banks (often publicly traded firms) are owned 
by a small segment of society, community members and communi-
ty-based organizations play a limited role in the development pro-
cess.
By not reserving a ‘seat at the table’ for community members 
due to a limited commitment to collaboration, place-based CED 
projects suffer from limited transparency and inadequate demo-
cratic engagement. Decision-making is traditionally led by gov-
ernment and private stakeholders. As a result, place-based pro-
grams often limit attention to job creation and housing 
development. Moreover, they often fail to wrestle with entrenched 
barriers to social and economic empowerment grounded in histor-
ic racial segregation policies, state-sponsored racial injustice, and 
an unrelenting political commitment to global capitalism. This has 
birthed CED programs and political institutions designed to bene-
fit the wealthy through marginal improvements in the lives of the 
poor, and with little change to the status quo of wealth inequality 
in America.130
Scholars have also criticized place-based CED models on social 
grounds, contending that they perpetuate the segregation of low-
                                                   
 128. See id. at 985, 1010. 
 129. See generally KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 1. 
 130. See Cummings, supra note 84, at 913 (“The issue identified by scholars has been that 
oftentimes subsidies are used to attract development that not only does little for low-income 
communities, but has dubious overall effects on city-wide prosperity.”); see also McFarlane, 
supra note 21, at 333 (“Poor inner-city neighborhoods have not benefitted from the eco-
nomic development going on around them because economic development promotes capi-
tal accumulation and mobility that intentionally bypasses poor neighborhoods.”). 
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income communities of color from predominantly white, low-
poverty and “opportunity-rich” suburban neighborhoods.131 Sociol-
ogist William Julius Wilson was instrumental in advancing this view 
in the late 1980s, arguing that the structural challenges facing dis-
tressed, predominantly black urban communities had resulted in a 
“culture of urban dysfunction,” perpetuating the cycle of poverty.132
According to Wilson, urban revitalization strategies must focus on 
dismantling dysfunctional urban neighborhoods and helping low-
income residents move to communities with greater opportuni-
ties.133 The research of sociologists Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. 
Denton in the 1990s, captured in the acclaimed book American 
Apartheid, also proffered social critiques of place-based lawmaking, 
noting the persistence of racial segregation facilitated by place-
based CED programs, and instead calling for race-conscious devel-
opment policies that both prioritized integration and invested into 
the lives of marginalized individuals.134 These criticisms of the 
place-based CED model led to a series of lawsuits against housing 
agencies across the country for their failure to affirmatively further 
fair housing, as mandated by the Fair Housing Act,135 through their 
administration of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program.136
Seeking to address the racial integration challenges of place-
based lawmaking, development practitioners began advocating a 
“people-based” CED strategy.137 Advocates of people-based CED 
programs recognize the numerous political and cultural challenges 
associated with locating affordable housing in low-poverty, pre-
dominantly white neighborhoods (e.g., racism).138 Consequently, 
these advocates suggest providing low-income residents with the 
tools and resources necessary to move directly into opportunity-
rich suburbs themselves in an effort to bypass local politics. Predi-
                                                   
 131. See, e.g, Cashin, supra note 26, at 1991–93. 
 132. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60–62 (Reprint ed. 1990); see also Beloved Place, supra note 
61, at 271 (“Coverage in mass print, visual, and other media a pushed the negative archetyp-
al symbols of public housing—the high rises, the garbage, the gangs—into prominence.”). 
 133. Id. at 157–59. 
 134. See generally Massey & Denton, supra note 90. 
 135. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 90 P.L. 284, 82 Stat. 73. 
 136. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 119, 
91, Stat. 1125 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2001)). A more robust dis-
cussion of the social critique of place-based economic development programs, including the 
successes and failures of the LIHTC program, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, 
the Author intends to explore this line of inquiry in future scholarship. 
 137. See generally Randall Crane and Michael Manville, People or Place? Revisiting the Who 
Versus the Where of Urban Development, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y (Jul. 2008) 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7620/1403_719_LLA080702.pdf
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 138. See id. at 3–4. 
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cated on the success of the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program 
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
federal mobility program called “Moving to Opportunity for Fair 
Housing,”139 qualified applicants are provided with housing vouch-
ers that enable them to afford a “better” life in a better-resourced, 
but more expensive, neighborhood. Ironically, in recent years, 
shifting urban demographics and changing investment patterns 
have altered the traditional urban-suburban divide.140 Many former-
ly blighted urban neighborhoods are changing dramatically, while 
many formerly low-poverty suburbs are on the decline.141 As a re-
sult, housing mobility programs seeking to move low-income resi-
dents to “opportunity” may become, in some cases, a vehicle for 
urban centers to drive away low-income residents and pave the way 
for luxury housing for wealthier families and young profession-
als.142
These critiques fail to recognize the hegemonic nature of ne-
oliberalism as a political rationality—a “discursive logic that legiti-
mates exercises of power” by structuring the very language of poli-
cy debates and defining the limits of government.143 Neoliberalism 
not only influences the role government plays in supporting the 
market and using law as a tool to promote “rational” economic be-
havior, it shapes common sense assumptions about the capacity of 
government to enact a substantive vision of collective well-being.144
More than merely ubiquitous, some argue that neoliberalism has 
become an invisible form of power inseparable from the rule of 
law.145
                                                   
 139. See generally Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Mov-
ing to Opportunity, 1 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 110 (2006). For the consent decree that outlined 
the parameters of the Gautreaux demonstration, see Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 
665, 672–82 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 140. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 815, 820–21 (“Aware of trends that will make inner-
cities more valuable sites in the future, global private equity funds, real estate investment 
trusts, and other large international developers are increasingly being attracted to previously 
disinvested inner-city areas before they substantially gentrify.”); see generally SHERYLL CASHIN,
THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
 141. See Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the Age 
of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189 (2016). 
 142. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 820–21 (discussing the long-term gentrifying and 
displacing effect of projects that fail to include safeguards for existing low-income resi-
dents.).
 143. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
71, 84 n.74 (2014). 
 144. Id. at 85. 
 145. Id. at 85–86. But see Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 519 
(2001) (“[L]aw is an autonomous institution that serves a rich panoply of values, a good 
number of which, such as political freedom, individual conscience, and substantive equality, 
are unrelated to the efficient operation of the market or to economic growth. Law may be a 
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This Article contends that place-based and people-based CED 
models have failed to meaningfully consider the distributive justice 
implications of neoliberal development strategies. By focusing on 
the expansion of investment opportunities for private stakeholders 
in distressed neighborhoods, place-based strategies have perpetu-
ated wealth inequality while undermining the economic empow-
erment of the poor. Similarly, while people-based strategies appear 
preferable because they empower individuals with the resources 
necessary for self-care, they undermine the inherent social capital 
of distressed, low-income neighborhoods. Advocates of people-
based CED programs implicitly perpetuate a racialized, yet uncon-
scious bias that concludes—when it comes to low-income minority 
neighborhoods—there is nothing of value worth sticking around 
for. Though well-meaning, by encouraging low-income residents to 
“move to opportunity” in low-poverty suburbs, these advocates dis-
count the existing social and cultural capital of black low-income 
neighborhoods where non-market economic assets typically go un-
accounted in the development process. Further, people-based pro-
grams simultaneously privilege the supposed inherent value of op-
portunity-rich and predominantly white low-poverty 
neighborhoods, discounting the threat of racism and social isola-
tion for marginalized citizens of color. Much like the media images 
that painted a monochromatic portrait of my hometown of the 
Bronx, these policies reinforce the cancerous assumptions of racial 
inequality that remain malignant in the body of America.146
C. Neoliberal Entrenchment 
Noting the limitations of localism in addressing metropolitan 
equity,147 yet observing the history of unsuccessful attempts to cre-
ate and enforce regional forms of consolidated government,148
                                                   
precondition to the market, but once law emerges, it takes on a life of its own as an autono-
mous sphere of human activity.”). 
 146. See Beloved Place, supra note 61, at 273–74 (“Some assumptions are supported by da-
ta: that people who live in public housing are very poor; and that in some communities they 
are disproportionately minorities. Other assumptions – that residents in public housing do 
not work, that most of them receive income from public assistance, and that they consist 
overwhelmingly of female-headed households with many children – are not.”). 
 147. See Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 60 (2012) 
(noting “the localist system has helped create a great wealth and resource disparity between 
the central city and many of its suburbs. This is due, in part, to the ability of affluent suburbs 
to capture wealth and regional benefits by imposing externalities onto the central city and 
other parts of the metropolitan region.”); see also Cashin, supra note 26, at 1988. 
 148. See generally Christopher Johnson Acuff, Beyond the City-Country Divide: Race, Ref-
erenda, and Representation in Consolidated Governments (Aug. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), https://trace.tennessee.edu/
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scholars in the fields of local government law, housing law, and 
community development law have turned to “new regionalism” as a 
pathway forward.149 Lisa Alexander explains, “[n]ew regionalists 
support the creation of limited-purpose metropolitan govern-
ments, interlocal cooperative agreements, or other more informal 
and voluntary regional collaborations.”150 These regional collabora-
tions are voluntary, and in many ways, represent what scholars have 
called “new governance” or “democratic experimentalism.”151 The 
new governance movement emphasizes “a shift away from the mo-
nopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either 
the involvement of actors other than classically governmental ac-
tors, or indeed the absence of any traditional framework of gov-
ernment.”152 This retreat from formal regulation encourages the 
participation of non-traditional stakeholders in the public decision-
making process.153 From a normative standpoint, new governance 
theory strives to respond to the demands of progressive scholars 
who call for social problems to be resolved in a participatory, fair, 
and economically just way.154 Still, scholars have raised concerns 
about the ability of new governance approaches to both socially 
and economically empower marginalized stakeholders while ad-
dressing the root causes of poverty.155
These concerns manifest in an emerging CED model that per-
haps stems from the new governance movement itself—the pay for 
success model. As the private market has taken an increasingly 
greater interest in public welfare service delivery, a community of 
socially conscious “impact invest[ors]”156 has started to invest in an 
innovation called the social impact bond, or SIB. The SIB seeming-
                                                   
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=5877&context
=utk_graddiss (providing a quantitative exploration of city-county consolidation campaigns 
on minority representation, revealing race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status as critical 
factors in voting patterns). 
 149. See Cashin, supra note 26, at 227–28. 
 150. See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 643. 
 151. See, e.g., Introduction to NEW GOVERNANCE, LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, IN LAW 
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 2 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 
2006); Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Exper-
imentalism, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 673; Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s 
New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 649; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 152. DE BÚRCA & SCOTT, supra note 151, at 2. 
 153. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from 
Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 127 (2009). 
 154. See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 634. 
 155. See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 239, 241. 
 156. See McGrath, supra note 29, at 803 (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments made 
into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and econom-
ic impact alongside a financial return.’”) (quoting What You Need to Know About Impact Invest-
ing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, https://thegiin.org/impact-investing). 
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ly finds a middle ground in the ongoing CED debate by targeting 
social infrastructure programs that empower low-income families 
with tools to better their lives in the places where they live. Emerg-
ing in the U.S. in 2012,157 the SIB establishes mission-driven part-
nerships between the public, philanthropic, and private sectors.158
Private investors commit strategic investments toward social welfare 
programs with pre-determined timelines and pre-established per-
formance benchmarks.159 An intermediary organization coordi-
nates the operation of the SIB and plays a central role in selecting 
social service providers who facilitate SIB programs.160 At the com-
pletion of a SIB program, if the social service providers have suc-
cessfully met pre-established performance benchmarks after being 
assessed by an independent evaluator, the government stakeholder 
repays the impact investors their original investment, along with a 
return on their investment based upon social outcomes.161 If the 
SIB program is deemed unsuccessful, the impact investors are not 
repaid.162
By aligning private sector capital with underfunded social wel-
fare programs, SIBs offer the prospect of both financial and social 
returns for private investors, while helping to address important 
social challenges. Reminiscent of the themes of the new govern-
ance movement, the SIB replaces classical governmental regulation 
with collaborative processes that imbue non-traditional stakehold-
ers with decision-making power. Both scholars and practitioners 
have taken note of the SIB’s promise.163 Despite debate over the 
benefits and drawbacks of the model,164 the social finance tool is 
                                                   
 157. For a more robust discussion of the SIB, see generally Toussaint, supra note 126. 
 158. See EMILY GUSTAFSSON-WRIGHT ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE POTENTIAL AND 
LIMITATIONS OF IMPACT BONDS: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
WORLDWIDE, 1–2 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
Impact-Bondsweb.pdf. 
 159. See McGrath, supra note 29, at 810–11. 
 160. See MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
TO THE U.S. 15–16 (2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-
insights/from-potential-to-action-bringing-social-impact-bonds-to-the-us (follow “From po-
tential action: Bringing social impact bonds to the US” hyperlink). 
 161. See id. at 9, 14. 
 162. Id. at 15. 
 163. See generally V. KASTURI RANGAN ET AL., HARV. BUS. SCH., THE PROMISE OF IMPACT 
INVESTING (2011), http://www.filantropia.org.co/archivo/attachments/article/198/
Impact%20Investing.pdf. 
 164. See, e.g., Toussaint, supra note 126, at 162 (discussing some of the benefits of the SIB 
model, including: “(A) the expansion of investment capital for social innovation; (B) the 
transfer of investment risk from the public sector to the private sector; and (C) the prioriti-
zation of evidence-based preventative social welfare programs,” and also some of the associ-
ated challenges, including: “(A) the transaction complexity of SIB deals . . . (B) the execu-
tion risks that arise during the implementation of complex SIB deals . . . and (C) the 
political risk associated with SIBs”); Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance: How Social 
Impact Bonds and Social Impact Performance Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
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increasingly being used by governments across the globe to address 
an array of social issues, including prisoner recidivism, early child-
hood development, homelessness, and services for disadvantaged 
and at-risk youth.165
Perhaps most significantly, the SIB model provides a platform 
for governments to finance preventative, forward-looking social 
welfare programs that reduce public expenditures in the long 
run.166 Despite evidence that preventative programs yield long-term 
social impacts,167 governments often lack the public resources or 
political will to invest in the future,168 especially for hot-button po-
litical issues like criminal justice or poverty alleviation that are 
tinged with stereotype-laden questions of race and class. As a re-
sult, the emergence of a CED model that facilitates preventative, 
forward-looking social welfare programs via democratic experi-
mentalism seems a step in the right direction. 
Nevertheless, while the SIB model seems to integrate some of 
the best features of localist and regionalist approaches to CED, key 
challenges have plagued its development and may hinder its 
broader adoption by communities across America.169 As Lisa Alex-
ander reveals, new governance methods often struggle to disen-
tangle the power dilemmas that emerge when traditionally mar-
ginalized groups are placed in collaboration with “more 
economically and socially empowered groups.”170 In particular, Al-
exander highlights three common power dilemmas: (1) the prob-
                                                   
BUS. 447 (2013); Susan R. Jones, Is Social Innovation Financing Through Social Impact Bonds the 
Last Hope for Community Economic Development Programs During the Trump Administration?, 26 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 351, 357 (2017). 
 165. See JENNIFER GIOVANNITTI & JOSHUA OGBURN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
RICHMOND, GROWING THE PIPELINE OF PAY-FOR-SUCCESS PROJECTS (2018), 
https://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/Community%20Practice
%20Paper_2.2018.pdf (highlighting “20 PFS projects in the United States (100 across the 
globe) that are considered launched, meaning the feasibility and structuring processes are 
complete, and investors have agreed to the formal structure and terms.”). 
 166. Government spending is often targeted toward “crisis-driven services” that stand to 
yield results within one fiscal year. See Rebecca Leventhal, Effecting Progress: Using Social Im-
pact Bonds to Finance Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 523 (2013); see also Toussaint, 
supra note 19, at 78 (“Government-sponsored social service programs are historically reme-
dial in nature, targeting social problems as they arise or after they have materialized in 
communities.”). 
 167. For example, vaccinations have long been proven a far more cost-effective public 
health intervention than treating diseases after an outbreak or pandemic. See Keohane, supra
note 30, at 162; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs with Social 
Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 968 (2012) (“The SIB structure redirects mon-
ey from safety-net programs to more effective early-intervention programs.”). 
 168. See also Utting, supra note 14, at 6 (“Ongoing constraints associated with market 
forces, neoliberal ideology and conditionality have restricted social spending by govern-
ments, thereby opening up the space for non-state actors to engage in social service provi-
sioning and proximity services.”) (quotations omitted). 
 169. See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 187. 
 170. See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 644–45. 
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lem of demographic representation, where the representatives of 
marginalized groups, despite sharing similar demographic charac-
teristics, harbor competing allegiances that amount to a false rep-
resentation; (2) the problem of representative opportunism, where 
well-meaning, demographically or ideologically aligned representa-
tives act opportunistically to achieve their own private interests at 
the expense of the broader marginalized group; and (3) the prob-
lem of representative acquiescence, where representatives articu-
late their needs, often unconsciously, in language and terms that 
reflect dominant narratives and cultural beliefs, ultimately benefit-
ing the more dominant groups in the collaboration.171 These power 
dilemmas reveal that even when marginalized groups gain a pro-
verbial seat at the table, other forces may operate to weaken their 
representation, or silence their voices altogether, resulting in solu-
tions that do not benefit their long-term interests or address the 
deep roots of their oppression. 
In the well-trodden tradition of American development, the SIB 
is built upon a market-based model that fails to resolve these power 
dilemmas, often demoting community members and community-
based organizations to footnotes, statistical charts, and graphs.172
Although non-profit organizations may claim to represent the in-
terests of marginalized groups, they remain vulnerable to private 
interests tied to future funding and can be swayed by toxic narra-
tives that overshadow the populations they serve.173 Although short-
term metrics may be achieved to guarantee future funding, mean-
ingful democratic engagement may be overlooked and long-term 
economic justice undermined. The insistence on a service-
oriented, donor-donee development model may perpetuate a 
sense of dependency among program participants that “defines a 
status of subserviency and evokes fear, resentment and resignation 
on the part of the donee.”174 These flaws in the design of the SIB 
not only represent a waning of the primary role of government in 
the advancement of public good175 but, more generally, are symp-
tomatic of neoliberalism’s invisible dominance. Further, they point 
                                                   
 171. Id.
 172. See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 208; see also McFarlane, supra note 21, at 301 (“The 
development discourse, therefore, embodies a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic 
approach, which treat[s] people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be 
moved up and down in the charts of progress.”) (quotations omitted). 
 173. See Edgar Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1327 
(1964) (“The continuous need for new sources of funds and for renewal of existing grants 
can result in actual service activities remaining sharply curtailed for an extended period 
while field staff gather data and write up project and research proposals.”); see also Tous-
saint, supra note 126, at 156–57. 
 174. Cahn, supra note 172, at 1322. 
 175. See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 154. 
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toward the need for a ‘reconstructed’ CED model that can over-
come the deficiencies of our capitalist economic system.176
II. DECONSTRUCTING NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLUSION OF JUSTICE
Amidst the political tension, civic distrust, and ongoing social 
inequities that characterizes the Trump era,177 scholars are increas-
ingly demanding justice for the oppressed within our political 
economy. The perspectives on the root of the problems are varied, 
and the proposed solutions are diverse. However, discussions with-
in the legal academy that probe the theoretical implications of jus-
tice upon the rule of law remain inconclusive.178
Many political philosophers understand the term justice to be an 
ideal of democracy;179 an ethical obligation imposed upon citizens 
of a democratic government because it promotes the flourishing of 
human beings and the actualization of human moral dignity, 
thereby facilitating the best approximation of democracy itself.180
However, there has long been debate on the mode of democracy 
that best actualizes justice. From a political standpoint, the historic 
debate between those in support of classical liberalism and those in 
favor of the socialist welfare state has resulted in the ongoing re-
form of America’s liberal democracy. Yet, due to the dominant or-
der of capitalism, and both the accumulation of wealth and the 
monopolization of capital amassed by a bourgeois class, liberal 
democracy in America has historically triggered a conflict of moral 
values—equality versus liberty.181 Growing social and economic ine-
quality reveals the limits of liberalism’s theoretical ground, suggest-
                                                   
176. See id. at 220–21. 
 177. See generally James Goldgeier, How to Understand the Trump Era: The Deep Roots of Popu-
lism, Racism, and Unchecked Presidential Power, Foreign Affairs, Oct. 31, 2018 (conveying some 
of the challenges of the Trump Administration). 
 178. While several scholars have explored the meaning of justice in relation to legal the-
ory, a dominant legal theory of justice has yet to emerge in the legal academy. Compare
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978), with Richard Posner, The Ethical and 
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1980),
and ROBIN WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
(2014), and Troutt, supra note 31 (proposing a novel legal theory of structural inequality 
that taps into the multidimensional interplay of space, race, economic segregation, and in-
stitutions). 
 179. For a more robust analysis of the philosophical study of justice, see generally
GUTTORM FLØISTAD, PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE (2014). 
 180. See D. R. Bhandari, Plato’s Concept of Justice: An Analysis, J.N.V.U. (last visited Nov. 18, 
2019), https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciBhan.htm. 
 181. Equality brings with it a “moral” character, “something men aim at or by reference 
to which they guide their conduct.” JOHN REES, EQUALITY 11 (1971). Meanwhile, liberty’s 
meaning is ambiguous and complicated. See Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liber-
alism, 37 Phil. Q. 127, 130 (1987) (“The debate over the proper conception of liberty has 
been bitter and sometimes deadly.”). 
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ing—notwithstanding democratic constraints and the loose frame-
work of a welfare state—compromise is needed to deter growing 
social unrest and conflict between members of the proletariat and 
the ruling class.182
In his famous work, A Theory of Justice, American moral and polit-
ical philosopher John Rawls attempted to reconcile the tension be-
tween equality and liberty by articulating a conception of “justice as 
fairness.”183 A full critique of Rawls’ conception of justice as an ide-
ological framework to reconcile the competing values of equality 
and liberty is beyond the scope of this Article.184 Further, this Arti-
cle does not engage larger philosophical debates about the mean-
ing of equality and liberty.185 Instead, this section limits discussion to 
three points of contention with Rawls’ theory of justice that reveal 
an illusion of justice perpetuated by the hegemony of neoliberal 
rationality in America. 
A. Revisiting Justice—An Incoherency Critique 
For Rawls, justice requires “fairness” because inequality “cannot 
possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or de-
sert.”186 To identify the fair social arrangement, Rawls conceives of 
a theoretical “original position” whereby each person is assumed to 
be rational, self-interested, and guided by a personal conception of 
his or her own “good.”187 Rawls presupposes “mutual indifference” 
in the original position, or a “veil of ignorance” that represents, in 
his view, a state of equality of opportunity because human decision-
making is not influenced by knowledge of personal information.188
Further, this original position exists in a society marred by conflicts 
                                                   
 182. See Young-Soon Bae, Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice 3 (Aug. 
2002) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee) (on file with the University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE network). 
 183. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111 (1971) [hereinafter A Theory of Justice].
 184. But see, e.g., Gerald Doppelt, Rawls’ System of Justice: A Critique from the Left, 15 NOÛS 
259 (1981); David Gauthier, Justice and National Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls’ Ideolog-
ical Framework, in DEVELOPMENT AND MAIN OUTLINES OF RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 205–28 
(Henry S. Richardson ed., 1999); Alan H. Goldman, Response to Rawls from the Political Right,
in JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 435–62 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith 
eds., 1980). 
 185. But see, e.g., JOHN CHARVET, A CRITIQUE OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (1981); ERIK 
VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, LIBERTY OR EQUALITY: THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME (2012). 
 186. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 7. 
 187. See Bae, supra note 182, at 13. 
 188. In the original position, individuals “have no information about their place in socie-
ty (class position, social status), their natural assets (intelligence, strength), their own con-
ception of the good (plans, values), their particular psychological attributes (attitudes to-
ward risk, optimism), or about the particular aspects of their own society (its political or 
economic system, history and so on).” Bae, supra note 182, at 14. 
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of interest and limited resources, necessitating the soothing balm 
of justice.189 In such situations, “the parties would therefore find it 
rational to opt for a system of equal distribution of all social prima-
ry goods except where the inequalities lead to the maximization of 
the long-term expectation of the worst off group in society.”190
This conclusion reveals the core principles of Rawls’ theory of 
justice: (1) the liberty principle191 and (2) the equality principle,192
often referred to as the “difference principle.” Under the liberty 
principle, the basic liberties—relating to private matters, and criti-
cal to each person’s ability to freely pursue chosen ends193—can on-
ly be restricted for the sake of a greater system of basic liberties for 
society at large.194 Under the difference principle—based on a pre-
sumption that it is impossible to distribute social and economic 
goods equally, and the notion that some inequality may be neces-
sary to advance the collective good—society only seeks to minimize 
inequality.195 So long as opportunity is available to all who are “able 
and willing to strive for them, [the equality principle] will lead to a 
just distribution.”196 In response to concerns about differences in 
natural endowment, Rawls concludes that such contingencies are 
“morally arbitrary” and cannot be avoided nor merited.197 Thus, the 
difference principle serves as a guide to redistribute the benefits of 
morally arbitrary endowments. When such benefits are redistribut-
ed under a veil of ignorance, they will maximize benefits for the 
least well-off and benefit the larger community.198
                                                   
 189. See Bae, supra note 182, at 15. 
 190. VINIT HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY AND PERFECTIONISM 164 (1979). 
 191. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 271 (1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL 
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183, at 53. 
 194. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 203, 229. 
 195. See Bae, supra note 182, at 23. 
 196. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 66. 
 197. Id. at 311–12. 
 198. See Bae, supra note 182, at 29; see also A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 176 
(asserting that the principles “not only . . . protect [individuals’] basic rights but . . . in-
sure . . . against the worst eventualities.”). 
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Rawls further argues that the liberty principle should take prec-
edent over the equality principle.199 He reasons, “[t]he basis for 
self-esteem in a just society is not one’s income share but the pub-
licly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties.” 
Rawls contends that while liberty is a value embedded within a 
government’s constitutional process because “it is more urgent to 
settle the essentials dealing with the basic freedoms,”200 economic 
matters are to be resolved at the legislative stage, presumably be-
cause they take more time to resolve. However, these conclusions 
prove incoherent when confronted by modern poverty. 
History reveals that “those who control the means of production 
have an inordinate influence in the [constitutional process],”201
challenging the presumption that a powerful ruling class will up-
hold the difference principle through legislation. Such conclusions 
confound Rawls’ theory and reveal the limits of his balancing ap-
proach to matters of economic inequality, principally because the 
self-interested decision-making of the ruling class can be justified 
by the priority ordering of liberty before equality. The privileging 
of liberty assumes that equality is only possible within the social 
and political constraints imposed by a sovereign authority that pre-
serves freedom. Evoking a Hobbesian conception of human nature 
as fundamentally evil and self-interested, Rawls suggests that we 
need law and order before we can work toward equality. But this 
ordering lacks any objective foundation, and the hierarchy could 
be inverted. Equality could just as easily presuppose liberty if we 
believe that humans are capable—evoking a Lockean belief in the 
fundamental goodness of human nature—of living harmoniously 
and respecting the dignity of their neighbor. 
In truth, liberty and equality are mutually independent, incapa-
ble of being objectively ranked and calling into question Rawls’ as-
sertion that “either a private-property economy or a socialist re-
gime can satisfy this conception of justice.”202 Further, the 
incoherency of Rawls’ ordering reveals his assumption of capital-
ism as the dominant economic paradigm.203 Within a capitalist re-
gime, unless the ruling class voluntarily transfers economic bene-
fits to the working class, it is difficult to eradicate economic 
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inequality, especially when one’s liberty to pursue economic activi-
ty takes precedent over social and economic inequality.204
B. Rethinking Equality—A Universality Critique 
Even if Rawls’ privileging of liberty over equality is not incoher-
ent, it is difficult to claim as universally valid. At best, his ordering 
should be viewed as historically contingent, a phenomenon subject 
to change and conditioned on the willingness of communities to 
reconstruct the moral values and political principles that govern 
human interaction. John Rawls’ conception of justice presupposes 
a political order where law is necessary to constrain human nature, 
but participation in democracy is not necessary for one to achieve 
justice. Indeed, Rawls argued that the value of democracy, or polit-
ical participation, was purely instrumental;205 it merely provided a 
mechanism for individuals to secure collective liberty—the right to 
freedom of thought, expression, and association. As a result, Rawls 
believed that political participation should not be imposed upon 
all but instead should be taken up by the interested few.206 Howev-
er, this view is not widespread. Other political philosophers 
throughout history, such as Jürgen Habermas, have argued that 
political participation is intrinsically valuable, a necessary compo-
nent to human flourishing.207
In the early 19th century, the Swiss-French political activist Ben-
jamin Constant articulated these divergent views as the battle be-
tween the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the 
moderns.208 According to Constant, the “ancients” prioritized polit-
ical rights because they viewed them as necessary to human flour-
ishing, whereas the “moderns”—who were influenced by the indus-
trial revolution and capitalism’s promise of social mobility based 
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upon entrepreneurial effort—prioritized private property rights 
and the individual right to freedom of thought, expression, associ-
ation, and contract.209 Moderns believed that the interference of 
the state was not a necessary piece to the puzzle of experiencing 
the “good” life. Political theorist Isaiah Berlin later renamed the 
liberties of the ancients as “positive liberties”—a positive right to 
participate in government—and the liberties of the moderns as 
“negative liberties”—the right to be free from interference as one 
pursues human flourishing.210
Professor Danielle Allen contends that John Rawls’ privileging of 
liberty over equality reveals a prioritization of the negative liberties, 
or private autonomy, over the positive liberties, or public autonomy.211
In other words, Rawls believed that living the just life did not re-
quire one to participate in government if government ensured the 
basic liberties necessary for actualizing self-esteem. It is here that 
Professor Allen departs from the Rawlsian notion of justice, recog-
nizing its conditionality. John Rawls’ theory was premised on the 
existence of a ‘neutral’ state whereby public decision-making mir-
rors the cultural interests and general conception of good of all 
members of a polity.212 However, under conditions of diversity 
where citizens enjoy a wide range of cultural interests and concep-
tions of the good, it may be difficult for public decision-making to 
not impose upon the liberty of disempowered community mem-
bers.213 The legacy of Jim Crow in America highlights how some 
can interpret the law as promoting liberty, while it actually facili-
tates and creates inequality for an oppressed population. The no-
tion that liberty presupposes equality is contingent on whose liber-
ty is being upheld. As a result, the preservation of negative 
liberties—freedom from interference with one’s thoughts, expres-
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sions, and associations—may require that the positive liberties, or 
the exercise of public autonomy through political participation, be 
viewed as necessary to human flourishing.214 In short, under certain 
conditions, governments may need to prioritize equality to facili-
tate liberty and achieve justice. 
Recognizing diverse orientations of the individual and notions of 
“self-perfection” along the spectrum of sociopolitical life also sup-
ports the universality critique.215 Whereas some political theorists, 
such as John Rawls, view the notion of perfectionism as establishing 
the liberty of the individual, and the arrangement of political insti-
tutions as maximizing general human achievement toward “a fixed 
teleological principle,”216 others attach individual moral agency to 
the process of self-perfection, with citizens “calling each other to 
the better angels of their natures.”217 Those in the latter camp, 
evoking what American philosopher Stanley Cavell described as an 
Emersonian sensibility,218 view perfectionism not as “some fixed hi-
erarchy of ends,” but instead as “an individual ethical injunction to 
strive to be better . . . striving towards a higher ‘unattained yet at-
tainable self.’”219 The notion of a steady, yet sinuous, quest to im-
prove not only the self, but society at large, calls for a recognition 
of democracy as more than a collection of static, formalistic, and 
neutral institutions and processes; democracy must be seen as a 
process of self-transformation, with citizens remaining vigilant to 
the ever-present need to reinvent the self and identify new path-
ways for effective democratic citizenship.220 Framing democracy as a 
movement toward an amorphous conception of “better” attaches 
to it a moral agency and ethical subjectivity that explains the need 
for equal political participation, notwithstanding the importance 
of liberty. Justice is contingent on our willingness to question the 
subjective priority ordering of our democratic values. 
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Consequently, justice then not only requires equality in the 
rights that protect private autonomy, but also demands political 
equality—an equal right to participate in public decision-making. 
Democracy furthers justice by insisting upon the steady pursuit of 
political equality to not only protect liberty but facilitate our collec-
tive self-perfection.221 But, is American democracy democratic
enough? In other words, does American democracy enable the in-
vention of new pathways for democratic citizenship? Does the 
American citizen’s vote enable her to enjoy political equality? Or, 
does true political equality in America require a rethinking of 
equality itself, a rethinking of its relation to the many social and 
economic questions that lie at the heart of poverty’s puzzle? As 
Paul C. Taylor suggests, “[j]ustice requires more than integrating 
an America that remains otherwise unchanged, or making segrega-
tion more humane, or seizing power by any means . . . more than 
fighting simply against racial oppression . . . our inadequacy must 
itself be subject to critique and continually revised.”222
C. Reframing Liberty—An Indeterminacy Critique 
Even if we presume that the ordering of liberty over equality is 
coherent, and further presume that such an ordering is universally 
valid, the nature of political economy that facilitates such an order-
ing is indeterminate. To begin, consider the dominant conception 
of the term equality. Rethinking equality is difficult, hindered by a 
constrained ‘social imaginary’ that Antonio Gramsci referred to as 
cultural and ideological hegemony.223 According to Gramsci, cer-
tain ideas that are favorable to the ruling class are so deeply in-
grained in social and economic processes that it becomes almost 
impossible for most people to conceive of alternate ideas.224 Discus-
sions of poverty often focus on social or economic equality, while 
some progressive and critical scholars emphasize the additional 
importance of intersectional categories like racial equality or gen-
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der equality.225 Professor Danielle Allen argues that human moral 
equality—individual freedom as recognition of universal human 
worth (i.e., equal dignity)—is foundational to a democratic state 
and coextensive with liberty.226 One cannot experience liberty if 
one does not also experience equal dignity.227 Equal dignity, how-
ever, is undermined by the existence of laws, cultural practices, 
and societal norms that embed hidden biases and stereotypes.228
Thus, beyond attaining freedom from interference (private auton-
omy vis-à-vis civil rights), if liberty is coextensive with dignity, then 
liberty also demands a society where citizens enjoy an equal share 
in the ownership and creation of the laws, policies, and procedures 
that govern their daily lives.229 Danielle Allen refers to this aspect of 
political equality as the “co-ownership of political institutions.”230
This duality—liberty and dignity—manifests in two key goals of 
the civil rights movement—desegregation and integration. Desegre-
gation, a critical first step in securing liberty for black Americans, 
can be described as upholding and preserving the negative liber-
ties—freedom from the interference of racially-driven legal and 
societal prohibitions that infringe upon the private autonomy of 
black citizens. However, as Professor Allen explains, human moral 
equality also requires that we uphold and preserve the positive lib-
erties of all citizens—the freedom to participate in shaping socio-
political life to avoid domination by the biases or stereotypical as-
sumptions of those in power.231 This second requirement was the 
crucial work of integration, the second phase of the civil rights 
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movement that Dr. King embarked upon in his Poor People’s 
Campaign before his untimely assassination.232 As King himself 
states, integration “unchains the spirit and the mind and provides 
for the highest degree of life-quality freedom.”233 In other words, 
King viewed integration as a necessary step toward affirming the 
full dignity of black Americans by enabling them not merely to 
vote, but also to become “co-creators in the kingdom of culture.”234
The challenge, as King described it, is that while desegregation 
can be achieved by the requirements of legal reform, the law can-
not easily mandate integration. In his essay, “The Ethical Demands 
of Integration,” King remarked, 
The ultimate solution to the race problem lies in the will-
ingness of men to obey the unenforceable. Desegregation 
will break down the legal barriers and bring men together 
physically, but something must touch the hearts and souls 
of men so that they will come together spiritually because it 
is natural and right.235
Thus, human moral equality demands a radical reconstruction of 
our notion of liberty and, ultimately, our understanding of justice 
itself. Government must not merely enforce standards of non-
interference through civil rights and a rejection of toxic ideologies, 
such as white supremacy; it must also embrace notions of non-
dominance236 through integration. Such integration can only be 
achieved through appeals to “an unenforceable moral law . . . 
awakened in the souls of all.”237
It is here where scholars have oversimplified King’s clarion call 
for integration. By integration, King meant something more than 
merely compelling citizens of different races to live in the same 
geographic space or attend the same public schools. True integra-
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tion means engaging all community members in the work of creat-
ing and owning the political institutions that shape and govern 
their daily lives. By moving beyond a narrow focus on residency to-
ward a broader engagement with the political institutions that gov-
ern daily life, as David Troutt explains, integration becomes the 
process of “connecting housing-related resources to residency 
without limitation by race, color, religion, sex, familial status, na-
tional origin or disability.”238 This, of course, begs the question—
what constitutes a political institution and what housing-related re-
sources matter? Beyond America’s three branches of government, 
what additional political forces drive public decision-making and 
dictate whether law and order promotes dignity, thereby ensuring 
liberty and achieving justice? 
Conventional notions of government comprise elected public 
officials who craft laws and policies that operate within a political 
economy—the systems of production, distribution, circulation, and 
consumption of goods and services that define how people seek 
material well-being. However, the rise of neoliberalism in Ameri-
ca’s political economy reveals an abiding truth—large and power-
ful corporate institutions also yield a powerful influence on our po-
litical system.239 Further, the ownership of productive economic 
property that generates wealth enables one to wield political influ-
ence on our economic system.240 Consequently, the ownership of 
wealth in America should also be viewed as a kind of a political in-
stitution. Yet, the ownership of wealth remains highly segregated in 
America, enjoyed by a few, and left out of reach for many.241 The 
economic segregation of the haves and the have-nots must not only 
be understood as a form of “social leprosy,” but also as a denial of 
dignity itself.242
Thus, political equality requires not only civil rights protecting 
one’s freedom from interference, but even more, it calls for public 
autonomy—freedom from domination through a democratization 
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of the ownership of productive economic property.243 These two el-
ements are critical to promoting human moral dignity for all citi-
zens. This line of reasoning demonstrates the indeterminacy of the 
dominant neoliberal order. How then do we shift from a predomi-
nate focus on standards of non-interference via desegregation pol-
icies to embracing the demands of non-domination via meaningful 
integration across all aspects of sociopolitical life? The next section 
discusses the solidarity economy, or SSE, which scholars have de-
scribed as an alternative approach to economic life that can de-
mocratize the ownership of wealth and promote economic jus-
tice.244 SSE challenges the hegemony of neoliberalism by proposing 
a new vision of political and economic life. 
D. Reconstructing Theory—A Justice-Based Approach 
Although prevailing market-based CED models boast an ability 
to catalyze social impact by tapping into private sector financing, 
their adherence to the politics of neoliberalism undermines alter-
native approaches to economic development that may better ad-
vance justice. This Article argues that the adoption of a justice-
based framing of CED will inspire a shift away from the principles 
of global capitalism toward the communitarian values of the social 
and solidarity economy, or SSE, thereby promoting participatory 
and inclusive community economic empowerment.245
Economic development policy in America has largely been driv-
en by theories of economic growth grounded in neoclassical eco-
nomics.246 America’s economic institutions of production, con-
sumption, and distribution play a central role in determining 
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whether individuals can, or cannot, meet their material human 
needs.247 The neoclassical economic paradigm that drives main-
stream economic theory traces its origins to Adam Smith and his 
seminal work, Wealth of Nations.248 Premised on theories of human 
behavior that have been argued to be both primitive and largely 
inaccurate,249 the neoclassical theory of economics describes “a 
formulation of the economy based on models derived from ex-
change markets in which the forces of supply and demand operate 
to achieve a state of equilibrium deemed to be the optimal alloca-
tion of society’s resources.”250 Based on this framework, neoclassical 
economics embraces “efficiency” as the economy’s normative val-
ue, reinforced by a Protestant “waste not want not” ethic, and “ra-
tionality” as the basis of human motivation.251 Alongside claiming 
great predictive power through its preference for empiricism, neo-
classical economics describes a market that “seeks to promote effi-
ciency and wealth maximization, tends to ignore distributional ef-
fects, favors market solutions, and has a strong individualist bias.”252
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Critical legal studies scholars have long been suspicious of the 
rational choice theory of neoclassical economics, arguing that our 
marketplace should instead adopt a more “egalitarian, communi-
tarian, and progressive” conception of economic life.253 Further, 
scholars note that wealth maximization and economic efficiency 
are often incompatible with the anti-subordination and communi-
ty-building principles of critical theory. Notwithstanding, neoliber-
alism as a political rationality has shaped the role of law in devel-
opment—“the creation of stable and well-protected property 
rights, enforcement of private contracts, and limitation of the arbi-
trary exercise of government power—enabling a particular ideal of 
entrepreneurial liberty, not visions of society.”254 Scholars trace the 
origins of neoliberal philosophy to the early work of Friedrich 
Hayek, who described the economic market as “spontaneous or-
ders,” or cosmos; a complex system beyond the capacity of human 
knowledge.255 According to Hayek, law should remain subordinate 
to the economic market because government can “never be aware 
of all the costs of achieving particular results by such interfer-
ence.”256 However, this framing strips government of its substantive 
role in building a collective vision of society. Further, it renders law 
merely “a condition for the preservation (and optimization)” of 
the market.257 Accordingly, law derives legitimacy from creating the 
conditions for individual liberty, but it is not primarily concerned 
with notions of social solidarity. 
SSE represents an opportunity to explore the range of alterna-
tive economic frameworks promoted by critical scholars that ad-
dress some of the shortcomings of neoclassical economics and ne-
oliberal ideology. Specifically, SSE integrates elements of both the 
“social” economy and the “solidarity” economy. The social econo-
my—a variant of embedded liberalism258—offers an alternative per-
spective to the prevailing, crisis-ridden capitalist economic regime, 
focusing instead on empowering people-centered organizations 
and leveraging progressive societal norms that counteract the con-
                                                   
 253. Id. at 44. 
 254. Blalock, supra note 143, at 84. 
 255. Id. at 85–86 (quoting 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 38 (1981)). 
 256. Id. at 86 (quoting HAYEK, supra note 255, at 57).
 257. Id. (citing HAYEK, supra note 255, at 47–48). 
 258. See HARVEY, supra note 35, at 11 (“The term ‘embedded liberalism’ has been used to 
signal “how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded 
by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment . . . State-led plan-
ning and in some instances state ownership of key sectors (coal, steel, automobiles) were not 
uncommon (for example in Britain, France, and Italy).”). 
384 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:2 
ventional economic paradigm.259 The “solidarity economy” empha-
sizes redistributive justice, participatory democracy, and alterna-
tives to capitalism and a debt-based monetary system.260 Taken to-
gether, the combined social and solidarity economy offers a pro-
progressive approach to CED that serves as a counter-hegemonic 
advance against the structures of neoliberalism and the tenets of 
global capitalism.261
It is unlikely that present-day America will forego capitalism full 
stop for a new economic theory like SSE. Nevertheless, SSE incor-
porates principles that can help shift current CED models away 
from the dogma of market fundamentalism. The SSE theory focus-
es on reasserting the primacy of social control over private profit; 
emphasizing ethical behavior in economic activity; and rethinking 
economic life through the lens of democratic self-management 
and active citizenship.262 In other words, instead of individualism, 
SSE promotes communitarianism; instead of profit, SSE promotes 
equity; instead of privacy, SSE promotes democratic participation. 
When these principles of SSE are woven into an economic devel-
opment process, several strategies emerge that prove helpful in de-
veloping criteria for a justice-based conceptual framework of 
CED—(1) leveraging the existing cultural collective efficacy of 
marginalized neighborhoods by seeking to develop under-utilized 
community-based assets for the benefit of residents; (2) promoting 
local, broad-based ownership of newly developed assets to keep 
money circulating within the hands of people living in marginal-
ized communities; (3) encouraging the usage of local, community-
owned organizations and community-based financial institutions in 
the provision of social welfare services; (4) bringing community 
stakeholders to the decision-making table to foster transparency 
and engender accountability; and (5) prioritizing social welfare 
programs that consider the impact of institutional racism,263 system-
                                                   
 259. See Utting, supra note 14, at 2; cf. DASH, supra note 245, at 6 (explaining that new 
evolutionary biology supports the contention that humans are by nature not selfish and iso-
lated individuals, but rather inclined toward cooperative relationships). 
 260. See Utting, supra note 14, at 2. 
 261. The social and solidarity economy (SSE) traces its roots to historic debates on soci-
opolitical and economic problems facing Europe during the industrial revolution in the 
eighteenth century. The philosophy manifested as different economic theories—
cooperatives, self-management, mutualism, social economy, etc.—that served as alternatives 
to the hegemonic capitalist regime that had come to define modern economic life. It was 
further developed as a philosophical formulation by the utopian socialists and early cham-
pions of cooperative philosophy, including Robert Owen, Henri de Saint Simon, Charles 
Fourier, and Pierre-Joeseph Proudhom. See DASH, supra note 245, at 7. For more infor-
mation on SSE, see generally Utting, supra note 14. 
 262. See Utting, supra note 14, at 2. 
 263. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 8 (“Black revolutionary Stokely Carmichael and social 
scientist Charles Hamilton coined the phrase ‘institutional racism’ in their book Black Pow-
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ic economic inequality, and sustained racial segregation. These 
strategies stand in direct contraposition to the traditional drivers of 
place-based CED policy.264
As an economic framework, SSE is not without its critics.265 But, 
if SSE can help advance political equality by democratizing the po-
litical institution called wealth, and if political equality is a neces-
sary component of justice, then how might embracing SSE’s core 
principles change the way we think about CED policy in America? 
By seeking to de-commodify economic activity, SSE offers a differ-
ent perspective on economic life that can shift society toward a so-
cial conception of democracy that fosters justice. The current pre-
vailing ideology of corporate capitalism has inspired an alphabet 
soup of market-based CED programs—the LIHTC, NMTC, HCV, 
and SIB, to name a few. By embracing the principles of SSE, and by 
integrating its strategies into a coherent justice-based conceptual 
framework of CED, emerging development programs like the SIB, 
or the newer Opportunity Zones program, can shift from profit-
driven incentives toward a more democratic motivation for social 
welfare provision. Perhaps this approach would yield the ‘new gov-
ernance’ America so desperately needs. 
Importantly, this approach to CED does not perpetuate an out-
dated, unspoken, and implicit bias that assumes the deficiency and 
inherent inferiority of low-income, minority “ghettos.”266 It does not 
privilege our country’s legacy of white supremacy by implicitly sug-
gesting that the lofty American Dream exists for people of color 
generally, and black Americans specifically, only when such citizens 
abandon a toxic “ghetto” culture that has stymied progress since 
                                                   
er. . . . Institutional racism, or structural racism, can be defined as the policies, programs, 
and practices of public and private institutions that result in greater rates of poverty, dispos-
session, criminalization, illness, and ultimately mortality of African Americans.”). 
 264. See supra Section I.B. 
 265. See Utting, supra note 14, at 4 (“Neoclassical economic or rational choice theory, for 
example, has emphasized problems of free riders or shirking; organizational theory points 
to issues of institutional isomorphism as organizations and managers from different (private, 
public, collective) fields assume similar characteristics; radical political economy cautions 
about the capacity of powerful actors not only to repress but also to co-opt ‘alternatives’; 
neo-structuralist analysis critiques so-called neo-populist tendencies within the SSE move-
ment that depict homogeneity and harmony (as opposed to differentiation and conflict) 
among SSE actors . . . .”). 
 266. Cf. McFarlane, supra note 21, at 303 (“Considered underdeveloped rather than un-
developed, inner-city ghettos are described in terms of obsolescence and dysfunction, cul-
turally perverted and not in keeping with Western, middle-class norms.”); id. at 339; Alexan-
der, supra note 3, at 807 (“This deficiency-oriented construction of the inner-city . . . reflects 
an overly simplistic understanding of the actual dynamics occurring in some low-income 
predominantly minority, inner-city neighborhoods. It also ignores the positive social capital 
that exists . . . .”); see generally WILSON, supra note 132. 
386 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:2 
emancipation.267 Rather, it emphasizes a communitarian ethic, and 
envisions new ontological formations of community itself, both at 
the expense of the presumed rationality,268 utility maximizing, and 
atomistic self-interest of the “homo economicus”269 that undergirds 
our current neoclassical capitalist economy. Low-income, under-
served black and brown communities are not asked to “move to 
opportunity” in predominantly white, low-poverty neighborhoods. 
Nor are they asked to single-handedly solve their own poverty with 
resources garnered from altruistic social welfare programs as the 
beneficiaries of a new, Carnegie-inspired “gospel of wealth.”270
Instead, the justice-based framing of CED articulated below in-
corporates key principles from the SSE movement that celebrate 
the richness of American diversity and foster economic justice. 
This refashioning of economic life will require a shift away from 
neoliberalism toward a more social conception of democracy that 
challenges the plutocratic impulse in modern American life.271 Alt-
                                                   
 267. Blaming marginalized communities of color for their poverty is not new. In 1965, 
sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor under Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson, published The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, known as 
the “Moynihan Report.” In his influential report, Moynihan argued that the rise of single 
parent black households was not the product of a failing labor market, nor the result of dec-
ades of state-sponsored racial injustice, but the product of a toxic “ghetto” culture that 
served as a “tangle of pathology.” Specifically, Moynihan argued, “at the center of the tangle 
of pathology is the weakness of the family structure. Once or twice removed, it will be found 
to be the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial behavior that 
did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate [sic] the cycle of poverty and deprivation.”
See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR 
NATIONAL ACTION (1965), https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/webid-
moynihan. 
 268. See HARVEY, supra note 35, at 68 (“All agents acting in the market are generally pre-
sumed to have access to the same information. There are presumed to be no asymmetries of 
power or of information that interfere with the capacity of individuals to make rational eco-
nomic decisions in their own interests.”). 
 269. DASH, supra note 245, at 5 (explaining, “[t]he starting point for economic analysis 
in neoclassical economics is the individual, the homo economicus—anthropocentric, instru-
mentally (hyper)rational, atomistic and self-interested, utility maximizing, autonomous, 
economic actors. Emphasis on self-interest and maximization as prime movers of human 
action governed by the principle of competition strip the homo economicus—the ontologically 
cold and rational, calculative, instrumentally driven, atomistic man with a ‘separate self’—off 
[sic] any morality and substantive rationality, and create a thin theory of human action.”). 
 270. See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 155 (“Carnegie called for the wealthy to live ‘unos-
tentatious’ lives, and become ‘trustees’ for the poor, by giving away the majority of their 
wealth after providing ‘moderately for the legitimate wants’ of those dependent upon 
them.”). 
 271. The term “socialism” has become taboo. However, a “social democracy” is an ideo-
logical stance that strikes a balance between market capitalism and the welfare state. While 
capitalism facilitates a reliable means to generate wealth, its inability to efficiently distribute 
wealth among its citizens necessarily leads to economic inequality and eventually poverty. To 
engender more egalitarian outcomes, and to promote democracy, a social democracy asserts 
that it is necessary for the state to both regulate the economy and provide social services to 
marginalized populations within the society. Historically, the notion of a social democracy 
was associated with Keynesian economics, state interventionism and the welfare state. More 
recently it has been characterized by a commitment to addressing inequality and systemic 
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hough this uphill journey toward economic justice may seem far 
too difficult given the weight of partisanship in today’s political 
landscape, this Article argues that such a democratic awakening is 
necessary, not only to challenge the intransigence of market fun-
damentalism in American society, but perhaps more importantly, 
to embrace the underlying moral commitments of American de-
mocracy.272 Fortunately, the notion of sacrificing private profit for 
the sake of collective benefit is not entirely foreign to America’s 
market economy, as demonstrated by the rise of corporate social 
responsibility, social entrepreneurship, and social impact investing. 
By uprooting the market moralities prevalent in traditional articu-
lations of CED, and instead planting a firm commitment to the so-
cial responsibilities of economic justice, this Article argues that a 
justice-based conceptual framework of CED can sprout progressive 
projects and grow community-based institutions that target the 
root causes and structural determinants of inequality in America.273
III. TOWARD A JUSTICE-BASED THEORY OF 
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The pay-for-success model of impact investing, operationalized 
through social finance tools like the SIB, appears to be a promising 
approach to poverty alleviation. Indeed, it has already proven suc-
cessful in helping to address educational disparities in Utah, for 
example, through an early childhood education SIB financed by 
Goldman Sachs.274 Further, at least 100 new SIB programs are un-
derway worldwide. Nevertheless, the pay-for-success model reflects 
                                                   
oppression. See ANDREW HEYWOOD, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 128 (5th ed., 
2012); Jonas Hinnfors, Social Democracy, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 2423 (Bertrand Badie, et al. eds., 2011); Richard Hoefer et al., Social Welfare Policy 
and Politics, in CONNECTING SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY TO FIELDS OF PRACTICE 29 (Ira C. Colby 
et al. eds., 2013). 
 272. As Cornel West argues, a democracy is more than a system of elected leaders and 
political institutions, regulated by well-articulated check and balances. A democracy embod-
ies timeless values and ethical beliefs, defined by “an enlightened and motivated democratic 
citizenry . . . that can so effectively push for democratic change . . . through democratic in-
dividuality, democratic community, and democratic society.” WEST, supra note 7, at 203. 
 273. See Toussaint, supra note 19, at 81 (posing the following question to scholars and 
advocates of the emerging SIB model: “[a]t the conclusion of social service programs, are 
communities left more political engaged and prepared to challenge the institutional struc-
tures that perpetuate cyclical poverty?”). 
 274. See Nathaniel Popper, For Goldman, Success in Social Impact Bond that Aids Schoolchil-
dren, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/
business/for-goldman-success-in-social-impact-bond-that-aids-schoolchildren.html (“For 
people studying social impact investing, the results in Utah are exciting — even more so giv-
en the children’s success. Among the 110 students who had been expected to need special 
education had they not attended preschool, only one actually required it this year.”). 
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the rise of neoliberal rationality in CED policymaking. It deempha-
sizes the role of community stakeholders under an assumption that 
economic growth will nurture long-term community development. 
History has called into question that assumption, as market-based 
CED programs have largely failed to address the growing wealth 
disparities within American society.275
Scholars have made strides in combatting the pro-business and 
neoliberal trend in CED. Many now advocate for neighborhood-
level, comprehensive strategies that “empower geographically dis-
crete localities by channeling resources into communities to build 
affordable housing, foster community-controlled business enter-
prises, and provide important supplemental services, such as job 
training and child care.”276 Nevertheless, limited community in-
volvement in economic development decision-making must not 
become the endpoint of CED advocacy, but instead should serve as 
a launching pad toward a broader reconstructive movement for 
economic justice.277 Consequently, while existing CED models may 
incorporate some level of community engagement—often by 
choosing to fund community-based social service providers—more 
work remains to move beyond the power dilemmas of new govern-
ance approaches described by Lisa Alexander.278
Justice-based CED offers a new, perhaps simpler, framing of de-
velopment—what if lawmakers and development practitioners pri-
oritized justice? This section explores that very question, mapping 
the contours of a new conceptual framing of CED that points to-
ward the democratic principles of the solidarity economy. As de-
scribed below, justice-based CED is built upon three foundational 
pillars—(1) social solidarity; (2) economic democracy; and (3) sol-
idarity economy—forging a path for America to transgress its stub-
born systems of domination. Taken together, the conceptual 
framework evokes what scholars have called “the blending of people 
and place strategies,”279 while incorporating a unique emphasis on 
economic justice. The Author hopes that it will inspire a shift away 
                                                   
 275. See generally DARITY JR., ET AL., supra note 104. 
 276. See Scott L. Cummings & Gregory Volz, Toward a New Theory of Community Economic 
Development, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 158, 158 (2003) [hereinafter Toward a New Theory]. 
 277. See id. at 158 (“We must also measure success by the degree to which we are able to 
translate this community participation into structural reforms that actually distribute signifi-
cant resources to low-income communities.”). 
 278. See Angela Glover Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 INDIANA L. REV. 4, 
1273, 1278 (2001) (“Equitable development includes policies and practices to promote and 
manage regional economic growth in a way that maximizes benefits for residents of low-
income communities of color throughout metropolitan regions.”). 
 279. See id. at 1279 (emphasis in original) (“People strategies are investments in human 
capital, such as workforce development and safety net programs. Place strategies revolve 
around bolstering or safeguarding the physical infrastructure, the types of activities impli-
cated by transportation or environmental policy.”); see also supra Section II.C. 
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from the stalled localism versus regionalism debate altogether, and 
instead refocus attention on the demands of justice. 
A. Social Solidarity 
The first pillar of justice-based CED, social solidarity, calls for de-
velopment efforts to foster political equality for all people within 
and beyond the dynamic boundaries of modern communities, with 
the ultimate goal of conferring power.280 This goal can be achieved 
through two related strategies: (1) participatory democracy that dis-
rupts systems of class privilege and racial hierarchy embedded in 
law; and (2) equitable development initiatives that transcend local au-
tonomy concerns and embrace the regional dimensions of inequal-
ity. These two strategies work hand in hand. Creating participatory 
democratic spaces that build local power, such as broad-based mul-
tiracial coalitions that extend beyond the neighborhood level and 
engage existing political institutions, promote equity in public de-
cision-making by giving citizens tools to hold civic leaders account-
able. In turn, equitable development demands comprehensive 
strategies that transcend the boundaries of neighborhoods and 
consider the economic, political, social, and environmental dimen-
sions of community development.281 Yet, a comprehensive regional 
approach to participatory democracy must first wrestle with histor-
ical narratives of state-sponsored segregation and racial oppression 
that perpetuate inequality and weaken citizen power. 
Racialized narratives of poverty, perpetuated by neoliberal ide-
ology,282 operate to convince skeptics that poor people are poor 
because of their own moral failings. However, a progressive CED 
strategy grounded in economic justice demands a deeper examina-
tion of politically and socially fragmented communities.283 The first 
                                                   
 280. Scholars have already noted the need to integrate economic empowerment strate-
gies into CED through a regional, broad-based political reform agenda. See, e.g., Anthony V. 
Alfieri, Rebellious Pedagogy and Practice, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 5, 8 (2016) (discussing the legacy 
of “rebellious lawyering” as “a transferable form of clinical pedagogy and practice, [sic] and 
as a legal-political method of community- and social-movement-building.”); Toward a New 
Theory, supra note 276, at 159 (noting, “CED has treated low-income communities as isolat-
ed markets amenable to exclusively local remedial economic action. Yet . . . the roots of ra-
cial and economic segregation in urban areas have a peculiar political, as well as economic, 
history.”); see generally, David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Met-
ropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701 (2003). 
 281. See Troutt, supra note 26, at 1171–74. 
 282. Cf. Blalock, supra note 143, at 88 (“With this neoliberal conception of the subject 
comes the assumption that the subject alone bears responsibility for the consequences of 
her actions.”). 
 283. See Cummings, supra note 84, at 905 (“A CED program that focuses narrowly on 
structuring economic incentives and facilitating economic investment loses sight of the 
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pillar of justice-based CED encourages new ontological formations 
of community that transcend traditional geographic boundaries 
shaped by race and class. CED initiatives have historically treated 
low-income communities as isolated, problem markets troubled by 
a culture of poverty that can be fixed with neighborhood-level, 
place-based initiatives.284 Even where communities have imple-
mented social mobility programs,285 they have often failed to ad-
dress the political construction of historic racial and economic seg-
regation. In other words, the boundaries of community that dictate 
notions of accountability are illusory vestiges of white supremacy 
that both separate and ‘other’ black and brown Americans. This 
stems, in part, from an ideology of American exceptionalism—the 
notion that America operates under a post-racial, meritocratic so-
cial order where the American Dream is attainable for anyone who 
simply works hard enough.286 Individuals who embrace this ideology 
believe that poverty can be overcome by greater self-determination 
in poverty-stricken neighborhoods through targeted social welfare 
programs, or through good old-fashioned “tough love.”287
Calls for self-determination as a solution to poverty make sense 
considering the historic election of Barack Hussein Obama, the 
first African American president of the United States. After dec-
ades of sluggish racial progress and the continued expansion of 
the racial wealth gap, the election of President Obama signaled for 
many the dawn of a new day in American politics, the birth of a so-
called “post-racial” society, and the affirmation of what has become 
a persistent call for “colorblindness” and “race neutrality” in the 
law.288 However, just eight years later, the recalcitrant legacy of 
                                                   
deeply embedded political structure of inter-jurisdictional relations that constrains inner 
city economic growth.”). 
 284. See supra Section I.A. 
 285. See id.
 286. Yet, for many, the American Dream may soon be out of reach. See DEDRICK ASANTE-
MUHAMMAD ET AL., PROSPERITY NOW, THE ROAD TO ZERO WEALTH: HOW THE RACIAL 
WEALTH DIVIDE IS HOLLOWING OUT AMERICA’S MIDDLE CLASS, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY 
STUDIES 5 (2017) (“If the racial wealth divide is left unaddressed and is not exacerbated fur-
ther over the next eight years, median Black household wealth is on a path to hit zero by 
2053—about 10 years after it is projected that racial minorities will comprise the majority of 
the nation’s population. Median Latino household wealth is projected to hit zero twenty 
years later, or by 2073. In sharp contrast, median White household wealth would climb to 
$137,000 by 2053 and $147,000 by 2073.”). 
 287. See Steve Holland, Obama Has Tough-Love Message for African-Americans, REUTERS 
(July 16, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama/obama-has-tough-love-message-
for-african-americans-idUSTRE56G06K20090717 (noting that at the 100th anniversary cele-
bration of the NAACP, President Barack Obama “urged blacks to take greater responsibility 
for themselves and move away from reliance on government programs.”). But see DARITY JR.
ET AL., supra note 104 at 8 (“[S]tudying hard and working hard clearly is not enough for 
black families to make up for their marginalized financial position.”). 
 288. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, On Class-Not-Race, in A NATION OF WIDENING 
OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, 105 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos 
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white supremacy289 has resurfaced under the election of real estate 
mogul and entertainment celebrity Donald John Trump, ushering 
a new political order of pseudo-populism built upon a familiar 
platform of “law and order” and racial retrenchment.290 With the 
support of an overwhelming majority of white voters,291 Trump’s 
election led to the elevation of white-nationalist champion Steve 
Bannon to the White House advisor seat292 and the appointment of 
Jefferson Sessions to the highest position of federal law enforce-
ment.293 Although both Bannon and Sessions spent limited time in 
office, the Trump administration reveals the bitter truth about 
American post-racialism; the “problem of the color line,” as de-
scribed by W.E.B. Du Bois,294 remains a salient force in American 
life. The antiquated political perspectives of a few continue to belie 
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problems in the struggle to address issues of social and economic justice). 
 289. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 210 (explaining that white supremacy was historically “a 
political strategy intended to manipulate racial fears as a means of maintaining class rule for 
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 290. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race to the Bottom: How the Post-Racial Revolution 
Became a Whitewash, THE BAFFLER (June 2017), https://thebaffler.com/salvos/race-to-
bottom-crenshaw (“Not only did Trump’s successful white-backlash candidacy for the Oval 
Office revive Nixonian tropes of Black lawlessness and depravity—complete with gruesome 
caricatures of life in Black-majority inner city neighborhoods and calls for a return to white-
authoritarian “law and order”—but it also relied on an overt platform of racist retrenchment 
that prior Republican presidents had voiced only in code.”). 
 291. Cf. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Ed-
ucation, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/ (“Trump’s 
margin among whites without a college degree is the largest among any candidate in exit 
polls since 1980. Two-thirds (67%) of non-college whites backed Trump, compared with just 
28% who supported Clinton, resulting in a 39-point advantage for Trump among this 
group.”).
 292. See Julian Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Steve Bannon’s Role in Inner Circle of Trump 
Team Raises Fears of Security Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/30/steve-bannon-nsc-politics-national-
security (“Placing Bannon on the NSC, with his lack of national security experience, was a 
‘radical’ step, Rothkopf said, as the former Breitbart media chairman had shown himself to 
hold ‘racist, misogynist and Islamophobic’ views.”). Steve Bannon was eventually removed 
from his position, but he has vowed to continue supporting President Trump’s agenda of 
trying to erode Barack Obama’s political legacy. See Oliver Darcy, Steve Bannon Returns to 
Breitbart After Ouster from White House, CNN: BUSINESS (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/18/media/steve-bannon-returns-breitbart/index.html. 
 293. Trump Cabinet: Senate Confirms Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, BBC (Feb. 9, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38915273 (“The confirmation follows a series 
of divisive hearings during which Democrats attacked Mr. Sessions’ record on civil rights. 
Democrat Elizabeth Warren was silenced after recalling historic allegations of racism against 
Mr. Sessions.”). 
 294. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK; ESSAYS AND SKETCHES (New York: John-
son Reprint Corp., 1968) (1903) (the term “color line” gained popularity after Du Bois used 
it to describe the problem of racial discrimination in America). 
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the lived experiences of the many. Justice demands a vision of so-
cial solidarity that disentangles the threads of racism woven into 
the fabric of American democracy. 
The quest for social solidarity begs the question—are there hid-
den societal constraints that hinder human moral dignity and per-
petuate racial domination? The answer depends on how one de-
fines racial justice. Discussions of racial justice in America have 
traditionally sought to define racial domination and racial subor-
dination as “discrimination,” an irrational distortion of reason that 
can be remedied through the enforcement of neutral, unbiased 
legal principles by a benign, colorblind state.295 Emerging in the 
1980s and 90s, scholars of the critical race theory (CRT) movement 
proposed new conceptions of racial power, grounding their analy-
sis in the perennial tensions between prevailing “integrationist” civ-
il rights strategies and the unorthodox views of more radical, “na-
tionalist” factions of the black community.296 CRT scholars, such as 
the late Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Cheryl Harris, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Charles R. Lawrence III, Patricia Williams, Mari Matsu-
da, Devon Carbado, and others, waged an epistemic critique of the 
dominant framings of racial power, asserting that demands of “race 
neutrality” in laws and public policies served to not only shelter 
white expectations of de facto race-based privilege, but also legiti-
mized substantive inequality and rationalized the “property” rights 
of white privilege.297 In effect, the race-neutral and colorblind 
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sion between the normative and political strategies of civil rights lawyers was visible in the 
struggle for school desegregation. See generally Derrick Bell, “Serving Two Masters”: Integration 
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (explor-
ing whether “the political, organizational, and even philosophical complexities of school 
desegregation litigation justify a higher standard of professional responsibility on the part of 
civil rights lawyers to their clients”). 
 297. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness as 
Property and Racial Performance as Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 8, 9–
10 (2015); see also, generally, Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Theory Meets Social 
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 156–57 (2014) (describing the impact of critical race 
theory’s critique of formalism and neutrality in law); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (1993) (arguing that “distortions in affirmative action doctrine 
can only be addressed by confronting and exposing the property interest in whiteness and 
by acknowledging the distributive justification and function of affirmative action as central 
to that task”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the  Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Fem-
inist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139, 150–52 (1989) (describing the failure of legal doctrine to adequately convey Black 
women’s experiences as Black women); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical 
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 301, 303–
07 (1987) (offering “criticism of certain trends in critical legal studies scholarship that some 
minority scholars of color find troubling, including the CLS critique of rights and disdain 
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“post-racial project”298 of American political leadership has not 
freed America from the manacles of racism; it has instead rein-
forced and normalized racialized distribution of power, wealth, 
and opportunity, rendering us shackled to a false belief in the lofty 
American Dream and mired in a global capitalist society ruled by 
plutocratic elites.299 Post-racialism blinds us to the intimate connec-
tion between the phenomenon known as the American ghetto and 
our belief in an American Dream. In other words, we racialize 
space because of unspoken insecurities and deeply-held fears trig-
gered by the desire for self-perfection, or simply a need for some-
thing to ‘move on up’ from.300
History reveals a panoply of covert (and overt) systems of class 
privilege and racial hierarchy that have been baked into laws and 
public policies, making it immensely difficult for low-income 
communities to climb out of poverty.301 Local government policies, 
often supported by federal programs, have both created the urban-
suburban divide and have perpetuated false narratives about low-
income communities.302 The work to dehistoricize race in Ameri-
can culture and craft a colorblind society continues today; the early 
                                                   
for incremental, piecemeal reform”); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal 
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 333 (1987) (discussing 
how “combining deep criticism of law with an aspirational vision of law is part of the experi-
ence of people of color”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from De-
constructed Rights, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 401, 403–06 (1987) (discussing 
the CLS movement’s rejection of rights-based theory and its application for the black strug-
gle for civil rights). 
 298. See Lawrence, supra note 297, at 9–10. 
 299. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing the formal 
equality, which declares that only laws that classify by race on their face will be treated as 
suspect, actually legitimizes and reinforces the institutional and structural vestiges of white 
privilege and supremacy in society). 
 300. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 340 (“The ghetto is a place that makes the places 
outside of it (whether affluent central-city neighborhoods, the suburbs, or exurbs) a desira-
ble refuge and a safe haven. Racialized space also provides a stark point of reference that 
can make onlookers more content with where they are in their lives. Black racialized space is 
also space people usually leave as soon as they are able: moving up means moving out.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 301. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 217 (“If federal programs were not, even to this day, 
reinforcing racial isolation by disproportionately directing low-income African Americans 
who receive housing assistance into the segregated neighborhoods that government had 
previously established, we might see many more inclusive communities. Undoing the effects 
of de jure segregation will be incomparably difficult. To make a start, we will first have to 
contemplate what we have collectively done and, on behalf of our government, accept re-
sponsibility.”); see McFarlane, supra note 21, at 334 (“Bank redlining and Federal Housing 
Administration policies perpetuated and skewed this outmigration for many years by devalu-
ing neighborhoods that were racially mixed and by refusing to insure or make available 
mortgages for neighborhoods occupied by blacks.”). 
 302. Cashin, supra note 26, at 2026 (explaining that localism tends to “institutionalize 
societal attitudes that, in turn, reinforce existing disparities of power, wealth and social ac-
cess.”).
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twenty-first century has already witnessed assaults on affirmative ac-
tion and voting rights, to name a few.303 New laws and public poli-
cies designed to remedy economic inequality, educational dispari-
ties, or social challenges like criminal activity and drug abuse, con-
continue to ignore the institutional, structural, and ideological 
manifestations of racial hierarchy that continue in America to-
day.304 Even calls for our nation’s first black president to be “post-
racial,” followed by President Barack Obama’s sustained posture of 
racial avoidance (as evidenced in many of his presidential speech-
es),305 reveals the continued presence of race-consciousness in the 
American polity. Many hardworking and ambitious Americans who 
live in low-income communities still find themselves “stuck in 
place” because of their race.306 And, if human moral equality, or 
freedom from domination, is a key attribute of a just society, then 
CED in America has failed at promoting justice. 
Social solidarity requires a dismantling of the vestiges of state-
sponsored white privilege that impede human moral dignity. Un-
fortunately, scholars have noted a declining prioritization of race 
when engaging issues of poverty, with many practitioners seeking 
to instead refocus attention on issues of class.307 Notwithstanding, 
the ideology of racial hierarchy has led to continued rationaliza-
tions of the income gap, the wealth gap, the achievement gap, the 
                                                   
 303. Cf. Ari Berman, The Trump Administration Is Planning an Unprecedented Attack on Vot-
ing Rights, THE NATION (June 30, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-trump-
administration-is-planning-an-unprecedented-attack-on-voting-rights/. 
 304. See generally Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM 
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (3 ed., 2009) (arguing that the 
post-racial project has led to an increase in racial disparities in the quality of education); Ian 
F. Haney-Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010) (arguing that racial disparities in the American crimi-
nal justice system reflect the impact of our country’s unwillingness to resolve institutional 
racism, evident in our shift from civil rights and social welfare policies to stereotype-driven 
crime control tactics); Peter Halewood, Laying Down the Law: Post-Racialism and the De-
Racination Project, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1047 (2009) (arguing that colorblindness and the post-
racial project has contributed to increased economic inequality). 
 305. See Crenshaw, supra note 290, at 13. 
 306. PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (describing how political decision-making and 
government policies have marginalized black neighborhoods, perpetuating segregation and 
poverty that belie the promise of the civil rights movement.). 
 307. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS 
AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 2012) (classifying various categories of op-
pression experienced by black Americans that are rooted in class struggles). The erasure of 
“race” from public discourse transcends dialogue within the economic development com-
munity and manifests in other academic domains as well. For example, as award-winning 
novelist Toni Morrison explains regarding the field of literature, “[s]ilence and evasion have 
historically ruled literary discourse. Evasion has fostered another, substitute language in 
which the issues are encoded, foreclosing open debate . . . the system is aggravated by the 
tremors that breaks into discourse on race.” See TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK:
WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 9 (1993). 
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incarceration gap, the police brutality gap, and a panoply of other 
gaps we find ourselves stuck between, as the failings of an inferior 
“ghetto” American culture. These rationalizations of outcome with 
cultural inputs suggest, implicitly, that the poor are to blame for 
their lot in life. Yet, evidence suggests it is “racial differences in ini-
tial endowments of and access to financial resources that sustain 
and fuel the racial wealth gap.”308
Wrestling with the sticky issue of race becomes even more perti-
nent for CED initiatives targeting criminal justice reform, such as 
the first SIBs launched in the United States.309 Professor and civil 
rights advocate Michelle Alexander highlights the implications of 
race within the broader context of mass incarceration in America 
by noting, 
What is completely missing in the rare public debates today 
about the plight of African Americans is that a huge per-
centage of them are not free to move up at all. It is not just 
that they lack opportunity, attend poor schools, or are 
plagued by poverty. They are barred by law from doing 
so . . . the major institutions with which they come into con-
tact are designed to prevent mobility . . . .310
Alexander argues that our current prison industrial complex is in 
fact a new system of social control designed to subjugate marginal-
ized black communities, not merely a manifestation of wayward 
urban residents in need of “tough love.” Whether or not Alexan-
                                                   
 308. See DARITY JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 29. 
 309. Whether mass incarceration is an outgrowth of racially-tainted economic develop-
ment policies or simply the manifestation of similar personal choices, among a relatively 
homogenous demographic, it is undeniable that our prison system impacts an alarmingly 
high percentage of black Americans, stripping them of their humanity while incarcerated 
and limiting access to many civil rights once they are released. Today, as many as eighty per-
cent of black men have criminal records and are subjected to life outside of prison as sec-
ond-class citizens due to the stigma of their criminal record. Michelle Alexander, The New 
Jim Crow, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), https://prospect.org/special-report/new-
jim-crow/. Black Americans are significantly overrepresented in the American prison system, 
comprising approximately thirty-eight percent of the federal incarcerated population. See
Inmate Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). By imposing harsh drug laws and 
tough-on-crime policies on predominantly low-income communities of color, our system of 
mass incarceration has perpetuated a system of racial hierarchy in the United States, while 
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munities. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 8 (2010); Toussaint, supra note 19, at 64 (noting the formerly incarcer-
ated citizens are “shackled with the stigma of their prison record long after serving time be-
hind bars, a stigma that impairs their civil rights and limits their prospects for economic 
prosperity in the job market.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 310. See Alexander, supra note 309, at 13. 
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der’s contentions, though brutally convincing,311 are in fact true, 
they suggest that CED programs addressing the issue of prisoner 
recidivism, for example, should integrate (or be integrated into) a 
broader political strategy for criminal justice reform that engages 
issues of race. 
Broad-based coalition building as a participatory democratic 
strategy to foster political equality preserves the cultural collective 
efficacy of black and brown communities by honoring voice. Fur-
ther, it suggests a reframing of community by seeking to bridge ra-
cial divides.312 Traditionally, due to the disempowerment of com-
munity action agencies,313 the community development 
corporation (CDC) has served as an advocate for communities and 
their residents. However, CDCs do not always represent the full 
spectrum of community perspectives and experiences. Broad-
based, multiracial coalitions must include not only CDCs, but also 
labor unions, faith-based institutions,314 community-based organiza-
tions, educational institutions, and other community stakehold-
ers.315 A key feature of these coalitions is their multiracial design, 
                                                   
 311. Historically, enslaved Africans were viewed not as humans deserving of equal treat-
ment under the law, but as illiterate, hypersexual animals prone to barbarism and primitive 
violence. After the abolition of chattel slavery, the rise of “Black Codes”, and the later devel-
opment of “Jim Crow” segregation policies, horrific acts of racial terrorism were used to 
perpetuate a system of racial hierarchy in America that has, in some ways, persisted to this 
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 313. See infra section I.A. 
 314. See Brian Siebenlist, The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Smart growth and Regional-
ism, in SMART GROWTH, BETTER NEIGHBORHOODS: COMMUNITIES LEADING THE WAY 113-14 
(2000) (“[F]aith-based organizations have a base of values that gives them moral suasion. As 
a result, they enjoy tremendous credibility in public dialogue and are successful at commu-
nity organizing.”). 
 315. Maggie Potapchuk, Multi-Racial Coalitions and Partnerships, in FLIPPING THE SCRIPT:
WHITE PRIVILEGE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 103 (2005) (discussing how multi-racial coali-
tions comprised of residents and diverse organizational leaders work together toward com-
mon goals). Transactional law clinics at law schools can also serve as “engaged civic institu-
tions” that advocate on behalf of community members and use transactional representation 
techniques to advance economic and racial justice. See e.g., Susan R. Jones, Representing Re-
turning Citizen Entrepreneurs in the Nation’s Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY 
DEV. L. 45 (2016) (“The George Washington University Law School Small Business and 
Community Economic Development Clinic (SBCED Clinic or Clinic) in Washington, D.C., 
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cutting across traditional and illusory neighborhood boundaries 
and building communities of interest focused on poverty allevia-
tion and racial justice. 
Yet, the call for participatory democracy is not new;316 it simply 
has been silenced by America’s history of market-oriented CED 
programs. During the civil rights movement in the 1960s, organiza-
tions such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the Congress of 
Racial Equality lobbied government leaders to prioritize economic 
equality for politically disenfranchised groups.317 Even Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s famous “I Have A Dream” speech delivered on 
the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 began with a metaphor 
of a “bad check,” criticizing America for not honoring the debts of 
injustice to her oppressed populations.318 Nevertheless, responses 
to political demands for economic justice have been mixed.319 The 
tragic story of the defunding of community action agencies by local 
government leaders, largely due to an unwillingness to confer col-
lective power to poor citizens, reveals a silencing of poor commu-
nities and a perpetuation of oppressive social hierarchies. While 
local and state governments have initiated important social welfare 
programs,320 these programs have frequently failed to integrate 
community members into the economic development process or 
                                                   
provides legal representation to the nonprofit organizations that support returning citizens 
as well as direct representation to returning citizens.”); Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 
276, at 162 (explaining that “the equitable approach to CED . . . embraces a reconfigured 
notion of ‘community’—one defined not by traditional neighborhood boundaries but by a 
common interest in redressing poverty and inequality.”). 
 316. See Mark Engler, Dr. Martin Luther King’s Economics: Through Jobs, Freedom, THE 
NATION (Jan. 15, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/dr-martin-luther-kings-
economics-through-jobs-freedom/ (explaining that five years after his “I Have A Dream” 
speech, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began the Poor People’s Campaign, focused on jobless-
ness and economic deprivation). 
 317. See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160. 
 318. See Phillip Kennicott, Revisiting King’s Metaphor About a Nation’s Debt, THE WASH.
POST (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/revisiting-kings-
metaphor-about-a-nations-debt/2011/07/26/gIQArshBaJ_story.html?utm_term=
.2d90f71915f4. 
 319. E.g., Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160; Thomas F. Jackson, Martin 
Luther King and Economic Justice, DSA: DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF AMERICA (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.dsausa.org/martin_luther_king_and_economic_justice (“King’s assassination—
and the urban revolts that followed—led to a local Memphis settlement that furthered the 
cause of public employee unionism. The Poor People’s March nonviolently won small con-
cessions in the national food stamp program. But reporters covered the bickering and 
squalor in the poor people’s tent city, rather than the movement’s detailed demands for 
waging a real war on poverty.”). 
 320. See infra Section I.A. (discussing various governmental programs throughout Amer-
ica’s history that sought to provide affordable housing and promote economic development 
in low-income communities). 
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incorporate strategies for linking local coalitions to broader re-
gional reform movements.321
The recent rise in local government concern over metropolitan 
inequality marks a notable shift from traditional approaches to ur-
ban development.322 As Paul Peterson described in his 1981 book 
City Limits, urban development traditionally comprised only two 
central actors—local government and the private sector, with local 
government typically occupying a weaker negotiating position in 
the relationship. Reflecting a post-New Deal consensus that the 
governance of economic development programs belonged at the 
local level, most local governments historically focused on avoiding 
“capital flight,” which in many ways drove local politics.323 As a re-
sult, many local governments avoided redistributive policies to ap-
pease a corporate-dominated political economy. Richard Schrag-
ger argues that the notion of a “limited city” in urban development 
“still dominates the literature on urban power.”324
In cities across America, local governments are now employing 
progressive political strategies that include marginalized communi-
ties in the development process and promote justice by fostering 
political equality. Clawback provisions in development contracts, 
local living wage laws,325 community benefit agreements,326 and col-
lective impact agreements327 are but a few examples of participatory 
democratic strategies that have been used to empower residents 
and engender social solidarity across traditional divides. Communi-
ty-based stakeholders have also expanded their influence in CED 
initiatives.328 For example, in Cleveland, Ohio, University Hospital, 
a major nonprofit medical center, worked with the Mayor’s Office 
to procure 80 percent of a $1.2 billion development project that 
created more than 5,000 jobs.329 Alongside tapping into the re-
sources of local educational institutions, CED advocates are lever-
                                                   
 321. See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160. 
 322. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 36. 
 323. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic 
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 488 (2009) (“Governments in a capitalist system depend on pri-
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nities?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2016). 
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WINTER 2019] Dismantling the Master’s House 399
aging the thousands of CDCs and the growing number of commu-
nity development financial institutions that provide financial ser-
vices to marginalized populations.330
Even more, new political institutions are being used to promote 
political equality. A recent example can be found in the town of 
Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, where the Incourage Community 
Foundation has taken proactive steps to include community mem-
bers in decision-making and empower residents to influence local 
development.331 These participatory democratic strategies help to 
foster political equality by ensuring that the liberty of community 
members is not constrained by laws and policies that do not reflect 
their values or that embed false narratives about their worth. These 
progressive cities recognize that our vanishing social safety nets 
and increasingly neoliberal CED solutions are not stemming the 
tide of inequality. Professor Susan Bennett argues that decades of 
disinvestment in low-income communities, coupled with the “devo-
lution” of public welfare function, has destabilized the lives of very 
poor people and, in some cases, “untethered” them from commu-
nity relationships altogether.332 An untethering of poor residents, at 
scale, may complicate the formation of community-based coalitions 
necessary for social solidarity to develop. Indeed, the political in-
fluence of corporate capitalism reveals that a seat at the table is not 
enough. Thus, building upon the call for social solidarity, the next 
section discusses the need for a democratization of the economic 
factors of production within developing communities or, in short, 
a democratization of wealth. 
B. Economic Democracy 
The second pillar of justice-based CED, economic democracy, calls 
for development efforts to promote metropolitan equity by democ-
ratizing the ownership of wealth. The ownership of the primary 
factors of production within an economy—land, labor, and capi-
tal—often dictates who controls wealth. Traditional approaches to 
economic development have focused on a combination of supply-
side and demand-side economic policies that enable land, labor, 
and capital within a geographic location to produce more ‘goods’ 
for export, generating economic growth. The neoclassical assump-
                                                   
 330. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 40. 
 331. See Drew Lindsay, Rebuilding with a New Blueprint, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY 
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Putting-Residents-in-Charge-
of/237977. 
 332. See Susan Bennett, Coming of Age on $2 a Day, Evicted: What CED Has to Say to Today’s 
Untethered Poverty, 26 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 57, 58–59 (2017). 
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tions of perfect competition and economies of scale popularized 
exogenous theories of economic growth that predicted economic 
development benefits would trickle down to all members of a 
community. Such assumptions converged with neoliberal politics 
that suggested the private economic market could correct the 
‘market failures’ that lie at the root of poverty. However, the result-
ing market-oriented CED programs have not only failed to consid-
er who owns the economic factors of production but have also 
failed to account for the range of non-market economic factors of 
production in marginalized communities, including social capital, 
community culture, local decision-making power, neighborhood 
amenities, and public goods. 
Whether private developers revitalize distressed urban commu-
nities or whether low-income families are given the resources to 
move to low-poverty neighborhoods, the result is “a system that 
produces vast differences in privilege, and then tasks the most priv-
ileged with improving the system.”333 Conventional approaches to 
development perpetuate the belief that individual agency can sin-
glehandedly pull one out of destitute circumstances, while spread-
ing a stereotypical ‘culture of poverty’ based on an ideology of ra-
cial hierarchy. Conversely, justice-based CED recognizes that the 
solutions to economic inequality must wrestle with our nation’s po-
litical history of institutionalized racism that dictated who owns the 
primary factors of production that create intergenerational 
wealth.334 The justice-based framing reveals the influence of corpo-
rate capitalism on public decision-making, a non-market factor of 
economic production that should be viewed as a community asset. 
Indeed, institutional stakeholders typically gain ownership of pro-
ductive economic property within low-income communities during 
the economic development process. Justice-based CED urges local 
governments to shift the ownership of land, labor, and capital to 
community-based entities and community residents to more equi-
tably distribute wealth during economic development. 
The ownership of land in America has a complex history. The 
decline of the traditional urban-suburban divide has shifted the 
development trajectory of many urban spaces.335 In cities across 
                                                   
 333. Darren Walker, Why Giving Back Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), 
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 334. Cf. McFarlane, supra note 21, at 351 (explaining that economic development pro-
grams often ignore “configurations of poverty segregated by race or ethnicity” and “[threat-
en] to harden these boundaries beyond all hope of remedy because the program ignored 
current structural and historical policies that have shaped and configured our racialized 
landscape.”). 
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America, new patterns of investment and targeted government ac-
tion, or inaction, are making low-income neighborhoods increas-
ingly attractive to young professionals and wealthier families.336
Aware of these trends, private investors and developers are con-
stantly seeking ways to acquire the land in low-income, disinvested 
areas before they become gentrified.337 Much like the Urban Re-
newal of the mid-twentieth century, these development practices 
reflect the power dynamics of urban spaces.338 While CED pro-
grams have sought to improve the land, less attention has been paid 
to who owns the land. Community residents typically have little in-
fluence in the development process, and are rarely positioned to 
benefit economically from development programs in their neigh-
borhoods.339 The treatment of low-income neighborhoods and 
their residents as economic markets to be exploited for the finan-
cial gain of prudent investors stems not only from the plutocratic 
impulse in American life, but also from a racially-driven and stere-
otype-infused cultural framing of poverty.340 Black inner-city com-
munities, we are told, suffer from a “culture of poverty”341 and “mu-
tually . . . destructive forces”—unemployment, crime, lack of 
education, poor health—that reflect the dangers of concentrated 
poverty, the realities of minority behavioral choices, and the dearth 
of positive social capital.342
The narratives of poverty perpetuated by many CED programs 
undermine the relationship that low-income individuals have with 
their community and the non-market assets in their neighbor-
hood.343 Scholars have argued that structural disadvantage may be 
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arises from combining their assets and from the relative reduction in their dependence . . . 
[l]egal scholars and others have for some time pointed out the need to organize to achieve 
political power . . . [yet], ‘[a] basic tenet of classical political liberalism . . . is that the indi-
vidual rather than the organized group or community is the fundamental political actor.’”); 
Alexander, supra note 3, at 823–24. 
 340. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 339 
 341. See Wilson, supra note 132, at 60–62. 
 342. Alexander, supra note 3, at 825, n. 144; see also Darity, supra note 104, at 41 (“[T]he 
argument that intergroup disparities in wealth are borne out of group based cultur-
al/behavioral deficiencies is misleading and misdirected. Instead, we should focus on the 
long exposure of low wealth racial/ethnic groups to theft of wealth and blockades on wealth 
accumulation.”). 
 343. Cf. Alexander, supra note 3, at 825-29. 
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an inadequate proxy for understanding the complex social net-
works, cultural frames, and historical narratives that impact how 
low-income residents respond to their neighborhood’s condi-
tions.344 Low-income black Americans living in disinvested neigh-
borhoods, for example, may not believe that changing the culture 
of their community, or being gifted resources to move to a low-
poverty, predominantly white suburb, is the ‘best’ opportunity for 
their family. Notwithstanding narratives to the contrary, low-
income neighborhoods retain an important type of positive social 
capital called “cultural collective efficacy” that influences the ability 
of neighborhood residents to realize common values and maintain 
social control through participation in cultural endeavors.345 Alt-
hough low-income residents may not own the land in their com-
munity, they do collectively own community-based, non-market 
goods that bring economic value to the neighborhood, from cul-
ture, to social capital, to community relationships. These assets 
should not be discarded, manipulated, or destroyed during the de-
velopment process simply because they do not fit neatly into the 
box of our current legal regime. Rather than dismantle urban 
spaces deemed unworthy of preservation, a justice-based concep-
tion of CED queries how development programs can honor exist-
ing non-market factors of economic production and empower res-
idents by increasing the local control of land. 
There are several progressive projects in cities across America 
that are seeking to democratize the ownership and control of land. 
Community land trusts, land banks, and cooperative housing de-
velopments are but a few examples. In Boston, the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative has played a vital role in empowering low-
income community members to actively participate in the devel-
opment of their neighborhood.346 The organization was successful 
in creating a community land trust to redevelop housing on thirty 
acres of abandoned lots and preserve affordability amidst gentrifi-
cation.347 Land banks are another progressive vehicle whereby city 
governments exercise eminent domain to obtain city-owned land, 
tax- delinquent properties, and land owned by absentee landlords, 
                                                   
 344. See id. at 827–28. 
 345. Id.
 346. See Jessica Kannam, Community-Based Organizing for Educational Justice: A Case Study of 
the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative 10–11 (May 5, 2016) (UNPUBLISHED B.A. THESIS,
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5515d04fe4b0263cc20b
3984/t/57632a10d1758e98278180d3/1466116625824/Kannam_Jessica_2016.pdf. 
 347. The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative’s mission is to “empower Dudley resi-
dents to organize, plan for, create and control a vibrant, diverse and high-quality neighbor-
hood in collaboration with community partners.” DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD 
INITIATIVE, https://www.dsni.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
WINTER 2019] Dismantling the Master’s House 403
to be used for community development purposes.348 After obtain-
ing the land, land banks then transfer the properties to community 
land trusts that are democratically governed by neighborhood res-
idents.349 For example, a coalition of statewide and citywide com-
munity groups, faith groups, and labor groups in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, collectively helped to pass a law that will increase 
community entities’ control of up to 40,000 vacant properties in 
low-income neighborhoods.350 Such efforts empower community 
members to preserve affordable housing and resist the threat of 
displacement by gentrification. Finally, cooperative housing pro-
grams have been leveraged in cities like Washington, D.C. to com-
bat displacement during urbanization. Under D.C.’s Tenant Op-
portunity to Purchase Act, residents of an apartment building are 
granted a right to collectively organize and purchase their building 
when it is marketed for sale by the owner.351 The progressive law 
seeks to stabilize longstanding D.C. neighborhoods by providing 
financial counseling, technical assistance, and pro bono organiza-
tional/legal assistance in support of tenants becoming homeown-
ers.352
Alongside democratizing the ownership of land, economic de-
mocracy requires a democratization of the ownership of labor. Col-
lective worker-ownership has long been utilized in low-income 
communities to address systemic poverty,353 either by community 
members who form cooperatives because of an inability to access 
living-wage jobs,354 or by progressive CED advocates seeking to em-
                                                   
 348. See, e.g., FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LAND BANK AUTHORITIES: A GUIDE FOR THE CREATION 
AND OPERATION OF LOCAL LAND BANKS 2–3 (2005), https://files.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/LandBankAuthoritiesGuideforCreationandOperation.pdf. 
 349. See, e.g., Matthew J. Samsa, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits 
and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2008); Diana A. 
Silva, Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL 
L. REV. 607 (2001). 
 350. Karen Black, Philadelphia Achieves Land Bank Through Compromise, SHELTERFORCE 
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://shelterforce.org/2014/01/22/philadelphia_achieves_land_bank_
through_compromise/. 
 351. Kathryn Howell, Preservation from the Bottom-Up: Affordable Housing, Redevelopment, and 
Negotiation in Washington, DC, 31 HOUSING STUD. 305, 306 (2015). 
 352. Law school clinics have played an important role in providing legal support for co-
operative housing development in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Community Development Law 
Clinic, U. OF D.C. https://www.law.udc.edu/page/CommunityDevelopment, (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2019). 
 353. See Peter Pitegoff, Worker Ownership in Enron’s Wake—Revisiting a Community Develop-
ment Tactic, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 239, 244–45 (2004) (explaining that worker own-
ership generally refers to enterprises where workers buy in to the business and obtain either 
indirect ownership through a beneficial trust (e.g., an ESOP), or direct ownership through 
a worker cooperative entity structure). 
 354. See Jessica Gordon Nembhard, Principles and Strategies for Reconstruction: Models of Af-
rican American Community-Based Cooperative Economic Development, 12 HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB.
POL’Y 39, 46–49 (2006). For a history of the impact of cooperative economic thought in the 
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power low-income workers.355 By placing ownership of business ac-
tivity into the hands of local workers, the worker ownership model 
ensures that the benefits of economic development—monetary 
profit and job security—remain within the community. The prima-
ry vehicle for worker ownership in the U.S. has been the Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Developed in the 1970s, the ESOP 
allows for the redistribution of capital asset ownership from 
wealthy business owners to their employees through the form of 
company stock.356 The National Center for Employee Ownership 
estimates over 6,000 ESOPs in the U.S. as of 2016.357 Alongside the 
ESOP, the worker-owned cooperative is a nontraditional business 
ownership structure that challenges the capitalist assumption that 
business enterprises must be privately owned and autocratically 
managed. In a worker-owned cooperative, governance rights are 
based upon the democratic principle of “one-person-one-vote,” ra-
ther than a “one-share-one-vote” concept where voting rights are 
solely tied to a member’s capital investment in the business.358 For 
example, in California, the cities of Richmond and Oakland have 
sought to integrate employee ownership into the economic system 
through a project led by the nonprofit Project Equity, in collabora-
tion with the Sustainable Economies Law Center and the East Bay 
Community Law Center.359 The project was designed to launch and 
scale up local cooperative businesses and convert existing busi-
nesses to employee ownership models.360 Another example exists in 
Madison, Wisconsin, where the city has committed to spending $1 
million a year, over a five-year period, to establish new worker co-
operatives.361 In other cities, governments have supported the de-
                                                   
Black community, see generally JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2014). 
 355. See Pitegoff, supra note 353, at 241 (“Rather than an end in itself or just another way 
of doing business, worker ownership can be a vital element of a broader job creation, com-
munity organizing, or community revitalization strategy.”). 
 356. See Michael Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 655, 656–57 (2005). The author notes that the ESOP was the result of a collaboration 
between economist Louis Kelso and Senator Russell Long. Codified as a retirement benefit 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the ESOP enables 
companies to distribute company stock to employees and, in many case, earn a tax incentive. 
Id. at 257. 
 357. Employee Ownership by the Numbers, NAT’L CTR. EMP. OWNERSHIP (Sep. 2019), 
https://www.nceo.org/articles/esops-by-the-numbers. 
 358. Carmen Huertas-Noble, Worker-Owned and Unionized Worker-Owned Cooperatives: Two 
Tools to Address Income Inequality, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 325 (2016). 
 359. See generally PROJECT EQUITY, A BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING PATHWAYS TO OWNERSHIP 
FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME WORKERS IN THE SF BAY AREA (2015), 
https://www.planbayarea.org/sites/default/files/pdf/prosperity/East_Bay_Community_La
w_Center_Blueprint_for_Creating_Pathways_to_Ownership.pdf. 
 360. Id. at 2. 
 361. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 46; Co-operative Enterprises for Job Creation and 
Business Development, CITY OF MADISON (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.cityofmadison.com/
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velopment of benefit corporations, hybrid entities, and sharing 
economy initiatives that may better reflect community needs and 
capitalize on existing community-based assets.362 Importantly, how-
ever, scholars note that calls for self-determination through social 
entrepreneurship and business ownership are unlikely to reach cit-
izens trapped in extreme poverty. Professor Louis Howells has long 
called for a nuanced approach, developing individual capacities of 
the extremely poor to bring greater stability to their lives.363
Lastly, alongside democratizing the ownership of land and la-
bor, economic democracy requires a democratization of the own-
ership of capital circulating within and through a community. 
Scholars have argued that city-owned banks and credit unions with 
local involvement can empower citizens to dictate how capital is 
used within their community, whether to reduce tax burdens or 
support important public services.364 In the context of CED, Profes-
sor Susan Jones explains that democratizing the ownership of capi-
tal calls for “equal access to the social and economic benefits of de-
velopment” and “empowerment for residents as shareholders of a 
community’s economic development projects.”365 This may require 
a restructuring of the financial incentives that motivate investors to 
participate in market-based CED programs, but it is not an impos-
sible task. Economic inclusion initiatives in places like Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, reveal the viability of equitable development strate-
gies.366 A former rust belt city, Pittsburgh has recently seen growth 
in the healthcare, education, and technology sectors. To help 
promote equitable development, William Generett created Urban 
Innovation21, a consortium of 20 businesses, nonprofits, and gov-
ernment organizations that use a combination of business incen-
tives, grants, internships, and training programs to promote wealth 
                                                   
dpced/economicdevelopment/co-operative-enterprises-for-job-creation-and-business-
development/1646/. 
 362. See, e.g., Deborah Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed 
by a Community Trust, in Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks to Businesses, 15 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2006); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Strug-
gle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (2006). 
 363. See Louise A. Howells, The Dimensions of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenter-
prise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 161 (2000). 
 364. See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 887 (2019) 
(describing several legislative responses to credit inequality). 
 365. Susan R. Jones, Transactional Law, Equitable Development, and Clinical Legal Education,
14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 213, 213 (2005); see also Scott L. Cum-
mings et al., supra note 276, at 159; DARITY JR., ET AL., supra note 104, at 44 (“[C]ontrary to 
conventional wisdom, earnings and other types of income are not key determinants of 
wealth. . . . The linchpin for wealth accumulation is the transfer of resources across genera-
tions.”). 
 366. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 22. 
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generation in disadvantaged communities.367 Other cities have cre-
ated opportunities for “micro” impact investments by community-
based entities and even community members themselves.368 For ex-
ample, in 2014, the Vermont Department of Financial Regulation 
created the Vermont Small Business Offering (VSBO). The VSBO 
includes revisions to Vermont securities regulations that enable lo-
cal businesses to raise equity without having to navigate complex 
federal securities laws.369 To meaningfully narrow the wealth gap, 
institutional investors must consider equity-oriented development 
strategies, including sharing development opportunities with local 
community-based investors, funding social welfare programs with 
longer maturation periods than typical for impact investments, or 
even accepting a lower rate of return to facilitate greater commu-
nity economic empowerment. Community members should play a 
more substantive role in their community’s development process, 
including both program negotiation and program remuneration.370
From land ownership to community-owned labor and capital, 
progressive CED projects have leveraged nontraditional entity 
structures to shift attention away from the capitalist drive for profit 
toward a social solidarity focus on economic justice.371 These pro-
gressive CED projects—land trusts, land banks, housing coopera-
tives, worker-owned companies, community development corpora-
                                                   
 367. Id. Scholars have noted the value of entrepreneurship to helping marginalized 
communities generate wealth. Cf. Susan R. Jones, Representing Returning Citizen Entrepreneurs 
in the Nation’s Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 45, 46–47 (2016) 
([T]here are 28.5 million U.S. businesses; 25.1 million, or 88 percent, of these are micro-
businesses operating with five or fewer employees . . . The median net worth for a nonbusi-
ness owner is $85,000, and for a business owner, it is $211,000.”). But see DARITY JR., ET AL., 
supra note 104, at 33 (“When we compile the data even those members of marginalized 
communities who manage to enter into entrepreneurship largely fail. This is due to a num-
ber of factors ranging from under-capitalization, limited market access, or outright theft or 
destruction.”). 
 368. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 58–59; Louisa Schibli & Janice Shade, In-
vesting in the Local Economy: A Win/Win for Business and Community, VERMONTBIZ (June 24, 
2016), http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/investing-local-economy-winwin-business-and-
community; Vermont Small Business Offering Exemption Helps Small Businesses to Raise Capital,
VERMONTBIZ (June 16, 2016), https://vermontbiz.com/news/june/vermont-small-business-
offering-exemption-helps-small-businesses-raise-capital; VT. DEP’T OF FIN. REGULATION, Ex-
emptions, VERMONT.GOV (2019) https://dfr.vermont.gov/industry/securities/corporate-
finance/exemptions. 
 369. See, e.g., S.B. 220, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2014). 
 370. For discussions of policies and initiatives designed to democratize ownership in 
marginalized communities, see generally Democratizing Ownership, DEMOCRACY 
COLLABORATIVE, https://democracycollaborative.org/democracycollaborative/ownership/
Democratizing%20Ownership, (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 371. See generally KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13; HOLDING GROUND: THE REBIRTH OF 
DUDLEY STREET DOCUMENTARY (New Day Films 1996); PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR,
STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994). Both sources 
describe how a community-based nonprofit organization used the community land trust 
model, the power of eminent domain, and grassroots organizing to create more affordable 
housing options for residents. 
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tions, social enterprises, credit unions, and others—are being ex-
plored across the country. They are helping to democratize the 
ownership of the primary factors of production within economic 
markets. Still, a critical challenge lies in scaling these initiatives. 
While individual progressive projects may collectively chip away at 
the flaws in our capitalist system, they may nevertheless struggle to 
break down the walls of poverty that encircle America. Moreover, 
how do we account for the range of non-market goods produced 
within marginalized communities—social capital, culture, commu-
nity relationships—that do not confer wealth or power in the tradi-
tional sense, and are consistently ignored by CED programs? We 
not only need system influence; justice demands system change. 
Thus, the third pillar of justice-based CED focuses on creating sol-
idarity economy institutions that are community-owned, empow-
erment-centered, and strategically designed to combat the struc-
tural dimensions of oppression. 
C. Solidarity Economy 
The third pillar of justice-based CED, solidarity economy, calls for 
development efforts to create empowerment-centered and com-
munity-owned institutions that address the structural dimensions 
of poverty. This Article has argued that a justice-based framing of 
CED will shift policy beyond localist strategies toward politically 
progressive, regional, and equity-oriented solutions that advance 
economic justice by democratizing the ownership of wealth. How-
ever, unless these progressive projects are replicated at scale, they 
will likely fail to produce meaningful change in America’s political 
economy or address the growing wealth gap.372 Further, by ignoring 
non-market assets that hold value within certain neighborhoods, 
but lack value in traditional markets, progressive projects fail to 
address aspects of America’s economic system that disempower 
black and brown communities. While projects are often temporary 
or experimental, institutions are cemented into the local landscape 
via legislation that triggers systemic change.  
Yet, toxic narratives of poverty have hindered the adoption of 
progressive law reform. Too often, we pathologize the poverty of 
low-income communities by preaching a doctrine of personal re-
sponsibility.373 Viewing CED through a justice-based lens urges us to 
                                                   
 372. See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160. 
 373. See, e.g., Brandon M. Terry, Prisons of the Forgotten: Ghettos and Economic Injustice, in
TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 191 (“The white majority doesn’t hold govern-
ment accountable for changing the conditions in disadvantaged black communities but in-
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embrace a collective democratic responsibility to resolve our coun-
try’s legacy of institutional racism and economic segregation 
through law reform.374 Scott Cummings, Susan R. Jones, Roger A. 
Clay Jr., and Rashmi Dyal-Chand are but a few legal scholars who 
have highlighted progressive law reform strategies to overcome the 
vestiges of racial and economic segregation in America, including 
“establishing community land trusts, authorizing housing trust 
funds, expanding inclusionary zoning ordinances, and implement-
ing linkage programs.”375
The idea of legislating community-based institutions that reflect 
a social solidarity perspective of economic life and facilitate com-
munity economic empowerment is not new. Dating back to 1956 in 
the town of Mondragón in Spain’s Basque region, the Mondragón 
Corporation was formed to facilitate the creation of a solidarity 
economy. Over a decade earlier, in 1941, a young Catholic priest, 
José María Arizmendiarrieta, had settled in Mondragón as an 
evangelist. At the time, the small town was riddled with poverty due 
to the recent Spanish Civil War. In line with Catholic social teach-
ing, and in response to growing globalism, Arizmendiarrieta estab-
lished a technical college in Mondragón to train skilled laborers 
for community-based companies. He also educated community 
members about social solidarity and group participation.376 The 
Mondragón Corporation has since grown into a federation of 
worker-owned cooperative businesses, a self-sustaining economic 
ecosystem of community-owned economic enterprises.377 As of 
                                                   
stead directs all its resentment and hostility toward black ghetto dwellers.”). But see DARITY 
JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 44 (arguing, “[m]ore personal responsibility or motivation on 
the part of blacks is not what is needed. Rather, what is needed is an active program of 
wealth redistribution and the removal of structural and discriminatory obstacles that stand 
in the way of bridging the wealth divide.”). 
 374. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 8 (2011) (“The 
slums are the handiwork of a vicious system of the white society; Negroes live in them, but 
they do not make them, any more than a prisoner makes a prison.”). 
 375. See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 162; see generally Roger A. Clay Jr. 
and Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 257 (2009); RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN 
AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018). 
 376. Virgil Makilan Lorenzo, Toward Cooperative Ethics: A Ricoeurian Reading of the Educa-
tional Aim of Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, Founder of the Mondragon Cooperatives, (1998) (un-
published dissertation, University of San Diego) (on file with PhilPapers), 
https://philpapers.org/rec/LORTCE. 
 377. In 1995, the International Cooperative Alliance adopted the revised Statement on 
the Cooperative Identity, which contains the seven Rochdale Principles, along with a list of 
cooperative values—self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. 
Cooperative Identity, Values & Principles, INT’L COOP. ALL., https://www.ica.coop/en/
cooperatives/cooperative-identity (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (“A cooperative is an autono-
mous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enter-
prise.”). 
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2018, it is regarded as one of the largest companies in Spain, em-
ploying over 80,000 employees across four sectors—industry, fi-
nance, retail, and knowledge.378
Scholars have mixed opinions on the ability of cooperative eco-
nomics to overcome the challenges of corporate capitalism and 
neoliberalism.379 Nevertheless, the idea of creating solidarity econ-
omies that cement cooperative economics and participatory de-
mocracy into the local landscape has piqued the interest of com-
munities far beyond the shores of Spain. Although not always 
broadly publicized, and sometimes met with resistance,380 solidarity 
economies have been implemented in many regions of the United 
States for decades. For example, emerging from the American 
black liberation struggle, which spanned from Reconstruction to 
the Black Power Movement following the Civil Rights Movement,381
the Jackson-Kush Plan sought to incorporate the principles of the 
solidarity economy and participatory democracy into a grassroots 
effort to develop the eastern Black Belt portions of Mississippi, in-
                                                   
 378. MONDRAGON CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2012), 
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 380. See generally JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN AMERICA (2009) (describ-
ing the largely unknown history of American cooperative movements for social change, 
from farming to labor, that were each met with unique challenges and resistance).
 381. For more information on the black liberation movement, see generally GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA (1995) (providing a sweeping account of the struggle for 
racial justice in the United States, from reconstruction to the rise of the black power move-
ment); Adjoa Aiyetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements for Repara-
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WESLEYAN L. REV. 687 (2010) (describing the social movement for reparations in the United 
States).
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cluding the city of Jackson.382 Founded in 2008 by the Malcolm X 
Grassroots Movement and its parent organization, the New Afrikan 
Peoples Organization, the Jackson-Kush Plan sought to foster self-
determination, social liberation, and economic justice for histori-
cally marginalized black communities.383 More than simply a series 
of progressive projects, it was designed to build an ecosystem of 
cooperatively-owned entities via progressive legislation that gener-
ated wealth for local families while honoring non-market commu-
nity-based assets. 
Cooperation Jackson, the present-day outgrowth of the Jackson-
Kush Plan, proclaims as its agenda a mission to “create jobs with 
rights, dignity, and justice that generate wealth and distribute it 
equitably based on the principles of cooperation, sharing, solidari-
ty, and democracy.”384 In the past few years, the group has taken 
over abandoned buildings and vacant lots, using community land 
trusts to nurture self-sufficiency and economic democracy.385 Some 
have called Cooperation Jackson a radical strategy for economic 
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taken for himself after his break from the Nation of Islam: El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz. Howev-
er, the plan was foiled by the Ku Klux Klan. On the day before the PG-RNA planned to move 
into the small town of Bolton, Mississippi where they had agreed to purchases twenty acres 
of land to start their community, PG-RNA leaders witnessed “a hand-painted sign near the 
property that the KKK had posted: NIGGERS, THERE WILL BE NO MEETING HERE 
SUNDAY. FREE SIX-FOOT HOLES.” NAPO and MXGM were later formed in the 1980s and 
1990s respectively to continue to advocate for social and economic justice for black Ameri-
can communities, and their work continues today. See Katie Gilbert, The Socialist Experiment,
OXFORD AMERICAN (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.oxfordamerican.org/item/1296-the-
socialist-experiment. 
 385. See, e.g., The Kuwasi Balagoon Center for Economic Democracy and Development,
COOPERATION JACKSON, https://cooperationjackson.org/lumumba-center/ (last visited Nov. 
20, 2019). 
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development because of its shift away from capitalist norms.386 In-
deed, Mayor Chokwe Antar Lumumba has been deemed “the most 
radical mayor in America” for his audacious plan to make Jackson 
the Mondragón of the South.387 Mayor Lumumba’s vision centers 
on co-governance, including forming “assemblies to elevate ordi-
nary people’s voices, an independent political party accountable to 
the assemblies, and publicly financ[ing] economic development 
through local cooperatives.”388 Held every quarter, the People’s As-
semblies are designed to provide a platform for community mem-
bers to critique government decision-making and engage in the co-
creation of sociopolitical life, evocative of the community action 
agencies launched during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on 
Poverty that were later defunded. While Lumumba’s emphasis on 
cooperative economics and participatory democracy may seem rad-
ical because of its roots in the black liberation movement, the no-
tion that community economic empowerment is radical merely 
underscores the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism. Indeed, Lu-
mumba’s ideas harken back to an oft-forgotten moment of Ameri-
can democracy—Radical Reconstruction—that once held similar 
promise for black residents of Jackson, Mississippi. 
During America’s Reconstruction period after the Civil War, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau laid the foundation for a more equitable own-
ership of land, labor, and capital by engaging the participation of 
black citizens in local government. Mississippi boasted the highest 
recruitment of black Americans into government among southern 
states with more than 200 black citizens elected to office in an 
eleven-year period. Sadly, a strategy of organized terrorism called 
the Mississippi Plan trampled upon the progress of formerly en-
slaved Africans by using violence and state-sponsored racial op-
pression to reclaim power for white conservative Democrats.389
Throughout the early to mid-twentieth century, Jim Crow policies, 
white flight, and decades of neglect and disinvestment by local 
government drove black neighborhoods in Jackson, Mississippi, 
deep into the well of poverty, a familiar story to many black urban 
communities across America.390 Like many American cities, Jack-
son, Mississippi—the place where civil rights activist Medgar Evers 
                                                   
 386. Cf. A Socialist Southern Strategy in Jackson, COOPERATION JACKSON (June 13, 2018), 
https://cooperationjackson.org/blog/2018/7/13/a-socialist-southern-strategy-in-jackson. 
 387. D.D. Guttenplan, Is This the Most Radical Mayor in America?, THE NATION (Nov. 17, 
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/is-this-the-most-radical-mayor-in-america/. 
 388. Nathan Schneider, The Revolutionary Life and Strange Death of a Radical Black Mayor,
VICE (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5gj7da/free-the-land-v23n2. 
 389. See Gilbert, supra note 384. 
 390. See supra, section I.A., describing how racism perpetuated poverty in many commu-
nities across America. 
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was killed by a member of the White Citizens Council in 1963 for 
decrying racial oppression—still struggles with racial tension.391
Perhaps the only things radical about Mayor Lumumba’s vision are 
his willingness to return to the participatory democracy of the Rad-
ical Reconstruction era and his commitment to the legacy of coop-
erative economics in black American life.392
Other examples of solidarity economies abound but must be 
scaled to take root in the American landscape. For example, pro-
gressive local governments have passed legislation for impact inves-
tors to support minority-owned businesses, helping to connect lo-
cal products and services to local demand.393 In Jamaica Plain in 
Boston, Massachusetts, the Boston Impact Initiative has taken an 
economic justice approach to empowering local residents and 
business owners to establish a community-controlled economy by 
providing a range of integrated capital tools—”loans, credit en-
hancements, equity investments, royalty finance, direct public of-
ferings, crowdfunding, grants, etc.”—to local community-based 
businesses.394 In Cincinnati, the Greater Cincinnati Foundation, in 
partnership with city government, created the Minority Business 
Accelerator,395 creating nearly 2000 jobs since 2003. Progressive lo-
cal governments have also launched revolving loan funds managed 
by CDFIs or local credit unions to finance economic empowerment 
through community-based cooperative start-ups and small to mid-
sized businesses. For example, Minneapolis-St. Paul created the 
Ready for Rail program to ensure that their new light rail system 
would benefit all community members. The program created a $4 
million revolving loan fund that has made over 200 zero-interest 
loans to small businesses, many of which are owned by black Amer-
icans.396 Additionally, in Oakland, California, Impact Hub Oakland 
and Self-Help Federal Credit Union created the Runway Project, a 
new five-year pilot program that “will explore how to fill in the 
                                                   
 391. See Jesmyn Ward, Racism Is ‘Built into the Very Bones’ of Mississippi, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/jesmyn-ward-
mississippi/552500/. 
 392. Indeed, Fannie Lou Hamer, a well-known civil rights activist for voting rights, was 
instrumental in the cooperative movement by organizing the Freedom Farm in Sunflower 
County, Mississippi in 1969 to secure food sovereignty for marginalized black families. As 
political economist Jessica Gordon Nembhard asserts, “there seems to be no period in U.S. 
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JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN 
COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 28 (2014). 
 393. See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 56; Toussaint, supra note 19, at 74–75. 
 394. See Investing for Justice, BOSTON IMPACT INITIATIVES, http://bostonimpact.org (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
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‘friends and family’ capital gap for entrepreneurs of color” 
through a dedicated pool of capital for business loans and a busi-
ness accelerator providing technical training and assistance for lo-
cal residents.397
Some solidarity economy projects have created new economic 
markets altogether, capturing the hidden value in non-market 
transactions and stimulating new forms of social capital. For exam-
ple, Dr. Edgar S. Cahn, creator of Time Dollars and the founder of 
TimeBanks USA, popularized timebanking in America as an alter-
native time-based currency to facilitate the exchange of skills and 
experience within communities by individuals with limited access 
to traditional capital.398 As Dr. Cahn explains, timebanking can 
“enable individuals and communities to become more self-
sufficient, to insulate themselves from the vagaries of politics and 
to tap the capacity of individuals who were in effect being relegat-
ed to the scrap heap and dismissed as freeloaders.”399 Another ex-
ample is the platform cooperative, a democratically-controlled dig-
ital platform that is cooperatively-owned and governed by its users, 
eliminating the need for traditional venture-capital funding and 
promoting the equitable distribution of power among members. 
Popular examples include Fairbnb,400 a cooperatively-owned online 
hospitality service for people to lease or rent short-term lodging, 
and Loconomics,401 a cooperatively-owned, online marketplace that 
enables customers to find freelance labor for everyday tasks. These 
solidarity economies enable community members and community-
based organizations to build wealth and experience the dignity 
that true political equality brings. CED practitioners can identify 
such opportunities by conducting inventories of community-based 
assets to map community needs and refocus revitalization efforts 
from a “deficit-oriented” approach toward a community economic 
empowerment mindset.402 Local governments can advance legisla-
tion that acknowledges the economic interdependence within and 
across regions, and the need for more equitable distribution of 
                                                   
 397. See Oscar Perry Abello, Closing the “Friends and Family” Capital Gap for Entrepreneurs of 
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community resources.403 These progressive mechanisms can help 
ensure that CED programs not only improve the lives of people liv-
ing in low-income communities but also promote long-term eco-
nomic justice. 
CONCLUSION
“It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. 
For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They 
may allow us to temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they 
will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”—Audre 
Lorde 404
A Harris poll administered in the summer of 1967, following the 
explosion of race riots in cities like Los Angeles, Detroit, and New-
ark, revealed that 40% of white Americans at that time believed 
that “the way Negroes have been treated in the slums and ghettos 
of big cities” was a primary contributing factor to social unrest.405
Prominent civil rights leaders, such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
were also beginning to connect racial discrimination against black 
Americans to a broader critique of America’s political and eco-
nomic system.406 In a posthumously published essay, titled “A Tes-
tament of Hope,” that discussed the black rebellions during the 
Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King asserted, 
It is forcing America to face all its interrelated flaws—
racism, poverty, militarism, and materialism. It is exposing 
the evils that are rooted deeply in the whole structure of 
our society. It reveals systemic rather than superficial flaws 
                                                   
 403. See Parlow, supra note 147, at 70 (suggesting region-wide taxation as a strategy “to 
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and suggests that radical reconstruction of society itself is 
the real issue to be faced.407
Despite a growing sentiment that low-income black communities 
have become “prisons of forgotten men,”408 CED in America has 
historically failed to address America’s legacy of institutional rac-
ism, systemic economic inequality, and sustained racial segrega-
tion. Place-based CED programs like Urban Renewal sought to im-
prove blighted urban neighborhoods, yet they have led to 
gentrification and increased poverty concentration. More recent 
people-based CED strategies, such as HUD’s Moving to Opportuni-
ty for Fair Housing program, have perpetuated a racialized con-
struction of distressed urban neighborhoods, while undermining 
the existence of positive social capital and non-market community-
based assets. These approaches to urban revitalization have been 
influenced by a neoliberal political economy that relies upon theo-
ries of economic growth that benefit private investors through 
marginal improvements in the lives of the poor, and little change 
to the status quo of wealth inequality in America. Sadly, although 
King delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of 
the Lincoln Memorial over fifty years ago, his words still ring true 
today for many low-income black Americans—”The Negro lives on 
a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material 
prosperity.”409
Emerging CED innovations, such as the social impact bond, os-
tensibly overcome the many criticisms of place-based and people-
based CED models. However, despite its proven ability to stimulate 
positive social change, this Article has argued that the emerging 
SIB model, much like the place-based and people-based CED strat-
egies of old, will struggle to achieve economic justice because of its 
grounding in the hegemony of neoliberalism. Building upon the 
work of progressive scholars in local government law, housing law, 
and community economic development law, this Article has articu-
lated a new justice-based conceptual framework of CED to guide 
the implementation of current and emerging economic develop-
ment programs. The justice-based approach urges local govern-
ments and public policy advocates alike to consider the economic 
values and political principles that underlie conventional ap-
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proaches to CED, proposing instead the guiding tenets of the soli-
darity economy where non-market human assets are valued and 
community relationships are prioritized. 
The three pillars of justice-based CED—social solidarity, eco-
nomic democracy, and solidarity economy institutions—not only 
challenge the dogma of market fundamentalism and neoliberal 
politics that have overshadowed much of America’s poverty allevia-
tion efforts since Reconstruction, it also advances a strong demo-
cratic vision of economic life. Innovative market-based strategies 
may allow us to temporarily beat neoliberalism at its own game, but 
they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. As Audre 
Lorde once remarked, “[t]he master’s tools will never dismantle 
the master’s house.” Perhaps with a focus on justice, America’s 
emerging CED programs can finally begin to unravel the web of 
social subordination and racial capitalism that has mired so many 
families in the trappings of poverty. Perhaps then, our heralded 
American Dream can finally become something worth fighting for. 
